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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CONSIGNING WOMEN TO THE IMMEDIATE ORBIT OF A MAN:
HOW MISSOURI’S RELOCATION LAW SUBSTITUTES JUDICIAL
PATERNALISM FOR PARENTAL JUDGMENT BY FORCING
PARENTS TO LIVE NEAR ONE ANOTHER1
INTRODUCTION
Shelly Osia had a simple request—she wanted to move with her children to
a new residence thirty-two miles away.2 Shelly and her husband had been
divorced for less than a year, and Shelly found it difficult to adjust to postdivorce life in her current residence.3 She had a long commute to work,
traveling over fifty miles from her rural Missouri residence to her job in Saint
Louis.4 Her three children had various health problems:5 one child had rather
significant allergies and skin problems6 and another child had ADHD, which
resulted in problems focusing at school and completing homework.7 The
children’s doctor was in St. Louis, and when the children had last minute
health problems, Shelly would drive almost 200 miles from her job in St. Louis
to pick up the children at school, take them to the doctor, return them home,
and then drive back to her work.8 Her ex-husband rarely assisted in these
doctor visits.9 These doctor visits were so common that Shelly reserved her
vacation leave days for them.10 The lengthy commute to work prevented
Shelly from being able to prepare breakfast for the children and help them get
ready for school. The children’s grandmother helped them get ready for school
each morning, but she was getting older and it was becoming increasingly

1. The title makes reference to Helentjaris v. Sudano, 476 A.2d 828, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1984) (explaining that relocation restrictions that trap women in a geographic location
where the only people who know her are those who know her as a couple with her husband are
“consigning [her] for the next decade and a half to the immediate orbit of a man to whom she was
briefly and unhappily married, to what is for her an alien environment in which she has neither
family nor professional ties”).
2. Appellant’s Brief at 5, Osia v. Osia, 260 S.W.3d 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Id. at 6–8.
6. Id. at 7–8.
7. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 6–9.
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id. at 11.
10. Id. at 8.
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difficult for her to be able help.11 The long commute also prevented Shelly
from arriving home much earlier than 6:00 p.m., which left her little time to
help with the children’s nightly homework.12
The children’s school district did little to ease Shelly’s stress. Because of a
shortage of staff and students, multiple grade levels were combined into one
classroom,13 and two of her children persistently struggled with their grades.14
Her son with ADHD had such a hard time concentrating that his tests had to be
read aloud.15 The school psychologist recommended that the child receive
individual tutoring or Title I instruction, but the school had few resources
outside of the classroom, and Shelly had to argue with the school to get her son
the individual instruction he needed.16
Shelly decided to move to another town so that the children would be able
to attend a school better equipped for their needs and to shorten her own work
commute.17 In compliance with Missouri’s statute regarding relocation, she
sent a letter to her ex-husband notifying him that she planned to move with the
boys in seventy-six days.18 To show her good faith in seeking to relocate, she
offered to provide half of the transportation19 and pay for the increased tuition
and child care costs.20 Her letter explained that her reasons for moving were to
“improve the children’s education, to allow her to attend more school
activities, and so that the children would be closer to their doctor’s office.”21
Shelly had already purchased a new home in the town where she wished to
live.22 In anticipation of relocation, she offered her current residence for sale,
which sold before her case made it to trial.23 As a result, she and her sons
temporarily had to move in with her mother nearby while she awaited the
relocation trial and her subsequent appeal.24

11. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 8.
12. Id. at 8–9.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 8–9.
17. Id. at 9.
18. Id.; Appellant’s Brief exhibit 2 at A18, Osia v. Osia, 260 S.W.3d 438 (Mo. Ct. App.
2008) (letter from Shelly Osia to Raymond Osia (Mar. 16, 2007) (on file with author))
[hereinafter Letter from Shelly Osia].
19. The children’s father had previously been providing all of the transportation.
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 9; Letter from Shelly Osia, supra note 18.
20. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 10.
21. Id.; Letter from Shelly Osia, supra note 18.
22. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 9; Letter from Shelly Osia, supra note 18.
23. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 10.
24. Id.
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Shelly’s ex-husband opposed the relocation for two reasons.25 First, he
complained that the increased distance would add twenty minutes driving time
to each visitation,26despite Shelly having offered to allow him to pick up the
children earlier, which would have given him more overall time with the
children.27 Second, he wanted the children to remain in the school that they
had been struggling in so they could continue to play on their sports teams.28
The trial court denied Shelly’s relocation request.29 She appealed to the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District, which affirmed the trial
court’s opinion with a mere memorandum opinion,30 the type of opinion the
court issues when it believes that the facts and law in the case would add
nothing helpful to a body of law.31
Shelly Osia is merely one example of a parent who has been harmed by
Missouri’s restrictive relocation law. Relocations are becoming increasingly
prevalent in today’s society and relocation law concerns continue to perplex
scholars and courts.32 Commentators have remarked that relocation issues are
“one of the most important topics currently affecting domestic relations law.”33
Parents move for career opportunities, educational opportunities, family
proximity, marriage, and changing neighborhood preferences.34 In today’s
modern society, changing residences is a common occurrence—on average,
families move once every seven years.35 Divorced families are generally more
likely to relocate than intact families.36 Seventy-five percent of divorced

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 11.
29. Judgment at A2, Osia v. Osia, No. 05WA-CC00096-01 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 24th Cir. Jul. 23,
2007).
30. Osia v. Osia, 260 S.W.3d 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam).
31. MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.16(b), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/ClerkHand
booksP2RulesOnly.nsf/c0c6ffa99df4993f86256ba50057dcb8/e43a2575286b55ef86256ca600521
5d2?OpenDocument.
32. Lucy S. McGough, Starting Over: The Heuristics of Family Relocation Decision
Making, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 291, 293 (2003) (noting that the issue has been a feminist and
father’s rights issue, has piqued the attention of social scientists, and inspired conferences,
symposia, and international surveys).
33. Jill S. Kingsbury, “Mommy, Are We Moving? No . . . Maybe . . . Yes . . . .”—The
Evolution of Missouri’s Relocation Law, 60 J. MO. B. 83, 83 (2004).
34. See Carol S. Bruch, Sound Research or Wishful Thinking in Child Custody Cases?
Lessons From Relocation Law, 40 FAMILY L.Q. 281, 282 (2006).
35. Id.; see also Amie J. Tracia, Navigating the Waters of Massachusetts Child Relocation
Law: Assessing the Application of the Real Advantage Standard, 13 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 139, 139 (2008) (stating that one-fifth of Americans change their residence each year).
36. Edward S. Snyder, Relocation Made Easier: In Baures, The Court Seems to Further
Alleviate the Burden Applied to Custodial Parents Seeking to Relocate, 165 N.J. L.J. 930, 930
(2001). The most common family-related reason for relocation is change in marital status.
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mothers will relocate “within four years after separation or divorce,” and half
of those mothers will relocate again.37 This upsurge in mobility is attributed to
increases in technological development, women in the workforce, remarriage,
as well as an unstable and unpredictable employment market.38
It is “unrealistic” to expect divorced or never-married parents to remain
indefinitely in the same geographical area and, in most cases, it would be
improper for courts to “exert pressure on them to do so.”39 In Missouri,
however, like many other states, it is often very difficult for custodial parents
to relocate with their children.40 Relocation is difficult even when the move is
a short distance away, even if the parent’s motive for seeking to relocate is
proper.41 While modern laws no longer allow husbands an explicit right to
choose their wife’s domicile, in practice restrictive relocation laws perpetuate
the outdated notion that consigns women and children to the immediate orbit
of a man.42
To be clear, this Comment uses the phrases “custodial parent,” “relocating
parent,” and “mother” interchangeably. It also uses “non-custodial parent,”
“non-relocating parent,” and “father” interchangeably. These terms are meant
McGough, supra note 32, at 292. “Three out of four custodial mothers move at least once within
the four years immediately following a divorce.” Id.
37. Sarah Gottfried, Virtual Visitation: The Wave of the Future in Communication Between
Children and Non-Custodial Parents in Relocation Cases, 36 FAM. L.Q. 475, 476 (2002).
38. Theresa Glennon, Still Partners? Examining the Consequences of Post-Dissolution
Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105, 118 (2007); see Lance Cagle, Have Kids, Might Travel: The Need
for a New Roadmap in Illinois Relocation Cases, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 255, 264 (2005); Judith S.
Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations
in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305, 310 (1996).
39. Carol S. Bruch & Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and Custodial
Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q. 245, 246 (1996) (quoting In re Marriage
of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 480–81 (Cal. 1996)); see also Michel v. Michel, 834 S.W.2d 773, 776
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting In re Marriage of Greene, 711 S.W.2d 557, 564 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (“In [a] highly mobile society, it is unrealistic to inflexibly confine a custodial parent to a
fixed geographical area, if removal to another area for reasons such as change of employment,
remarriage, etc., is consistent with the best interest of the minor children.”)).
40. The term “custodial parent” refers to the parent exercising the most amount of time with
the child. The parent who exercises visitation with the child is termed the “non-custodial parent”
regardless of whether the custodial arrangement is actually a joint custody arrangement, or a sole
custody arrangement with visitation rights. These terms are used to recognize the time allocation
between parents in joint custody situations and sole custody situations are often indistinguishable.
See Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathizing With Solomon: Choosing Between Parents in a Mobile
Society, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 791, 792 n. 3 (citing LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND
CHILDREN IN AMERICA 251 (1985)).
41. Although one Missouri family law scholar has argued that Missouri’s relocation law has
progressed “to a policy that tends to favor relocation,” in practice, it is extremely difficult for a
custodial parent to succeed in a contested relocation battle. See Kingsbury, supra note 33, at 83.
42. Helentjaris v. Sudano, 476 A.2d 828, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
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to highlight the gender bias inherent in relocation jurisprudence,43 and the
reality that well over 80% of parents seeking court-ordered relocation are
mothers.44 This terminology is consistent with the terminology used by other
family law scholars.45 It is this author’s experience, that Missouri’s relocation
law, much like the relocation laws of other states, applies primarily, if not
exclusively, to mothers seeking to relocate. In the author’s review of all
published Missouri appellate opinions in relocation cases, the author was not
able to find a single instance where Missouri’s relocation law was used to bar a
father from relocating with his children.
This Comment argues that Missouri’s approach to relocation is
fundamentally flawed and “jeopardizes the stability of custodial
arrangement[]” for the sake of the utopian idea that forcing parents to live in
the same geographical area will create a “simulation of unity.”46 This
Comment focuses specifically on Missouri’s relocation laws, but many of the
problems discussed are not unique to Missouri; rather, they are part of a larger
national problem. The critique of the law and the suggestions for change
discussed here may be applicable to any state seeking to improve their
relocation laws. Part I provides a general overview of child custody and
relocation law in Missouri and discusses how courts decide relocation cases.
Part II discusses the ongoing debate regarding the competing values of
custodial parents and non-custodial parents in relocation disputes. Part II
incorporates sociological and psychological research showing the impact of
relocation on children and parents. Part III discusses the numerous problems
with Missouri’s relocation law. Finally, Part IV advocates for a change in
Missouri’s relocation law and suggests a model that protects both the interest
of the mother and the father in relocation cases while emphasizing the best
interests of the child and encouraging judicial consistency in relocation
decision-making.

43. See infra Part III.D.1.
44. See The Hon. W. Dennis Duggan, Rock-Paper-Scissors: Playing the Odds with the Law
of Child Relocation, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 193, 198 (2007).
45. See, e.g., Alix Gravenstein Pastis, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: SexBased Discrimination?, 16 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 419, 421 (1986); Bruch, supra note 34, at
282, n.4.
46. Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 333 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Helentjaris, 476 A.2d at
832); Laura Caviness Cocus, Comment, Louisiana’s Restrictive Relocation Laws: Jeopardizing
Stability in Custodial Arrangements for the Sake of Geographical Proximity Between Divorced
Parents, 53 LOY. L. REV. 79, 82 (2007).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1370

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:1365

I. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF RELOCATION LAW
A.

Initial Custody Determination

When parents divorce, or when a child is born to unmarried parents, courts
make initial custody decisions regarding the child using a “best interests of the
child” analysis.47 Courts may award joint custody to the parents or sole
custody to one parent.48 Joint physical custody denotes a sharing of custodial
time with the child between the two parental residences; but the amount of
time sharing can vary greatly between individual joint custody orders. One
parent is typically designated at the primary residential custodian—that is, the
parent with which the child resides for the majority of the time. Courts also
fashion parenting plans that create a visitation schedule between the parents
and explain how costs and decisionmaking authority will be allocated.49 Once
courts make an original determination of custody, changes to custody are made
only when there are substantial changes in circumstances that require the court
to modify the original decree.50 This principle is based on the child’s need to
have a stable relationship with his or her parents as well as the advantages in
reducing the child to conflict by discouraging frequent litigation between the
parents.51
B.

Missouri’s Relocation Law

After the initial custody determination, a custodial parent wishing to move
must comply with Missouri’s relocation statute.52 Missouri’s relocation law
only restricts moves made by the primary custodial parent.53 Because courts
are constitutionally forbidden from prohibiting an adult’s right to travel,54
47. See MO. REV. STAT § 452.375 (2000).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See generally Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at 307; JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL.,
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 20 (1996).
52. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377 (2000).
53. Although nothing in Missouri’s relocation law specifically limits the law only to the
primary custodial parent, a comparison of Missouri’s law with scholarly literature indicates that
this is true for Missouri also. Compare e.g., Pastis, supra note 45, at 419–20, and Bruch, supra
note 34, at 283, with MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377 (2000).
54. See generally Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional
Perspective, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 67–81 (1996). Although no Missouri case has made
such a statement, and Missouri’s relocation law, on its face, appears to apply equally to both
parents, all the scholarly literature and many sister state appellate opinions have made clear that
relocation statutes like Missouri’s prohibit only the custodial parent from moving. In the author’s
review of hundreds of Missouri relocation opinions, she did not discover a single case in which
Missouri’s relocation statute was used to restrain the relocation of the noncustodial parent,
typically a father.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

CONSIGNING WOMEN TO THE IMMEDIATE ORBIT OF A MAN

1371

restrictions on the custodial parent’s mobility are justified as only preventing
the move of the child: in other words, the courts cannot prevent the primary
custodian from moving, but they can prevent her from moving with the child.55
In contrast, courts do not prevent noncustodial parents from relocating,
even if it would substantially impact the previous visitation schedule or
negatively impact their relationship with the child.56 A noncustodial parent’s
reasons for moving are irrelevant, and so are the objections of the custodial
parent.57
Missouri’s laws restrict all relocations made by custodial parents, no
matter if they are across the country or across the street.58 Although many
other states define a relocation as a move exceeding a certain distance (such as
sixty or 150 miles),59 Missouri does not protect the right of parents to move
short distances away without being the subject of litigation and a potential
change in custody.60
55. See Janet Leach Richards, Children’s Rights v. Parent’s Rights: A Proposed Solution to
the Custodial Relocation Conundrum, 29 N.M. L. REV. 245, 255–56 (1999).
56. See, e.g., Pastis, supra note 45, at 420; Richards, supra note 55, at 255; Bruch, supra
note 34, at 283
57. Bruch, supra note 34, at 283.
58. See MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377 (2000); see, e.g., Sarah Downey, The Moving Van Wars:
Relocation Is Becoming an Increasingly Contentious Issue for Ex-Spouses Who Must Balance
Kids and Jobs, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2000, at 53, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/
82959.
59. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:355.1–9:355.17 (2006) (outside of state or 150 or more miles); OR.
REV. STAT. § 107.159 (2007) (sixty or more miles from other parent); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-337 (2008) (outside of state or 150 or more miles); Fossum v. Fossum, 545 N.W.2d 828, 832 (S.D.
1996) (reversing the trial court’s order to transfer custody to the father when custodial parent
sought to move seventy miles away for employment and holding that the general rule is that
minor geographical changes should not be regarded as substantial changes in circumstances to
change custody). There have been several attempts to change Missouri’s relocation law to allow
parents to move short distances away, but they have not been passed by the legislature. See S.B.
1006, 90th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2000) (sixty miles); H.R. 722, 90th Gen. Assem., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2000) (thirty miles); S.B. 539, 91st Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001)
(sixty miles); S.B. 539, 91st Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001) (Sen. Sub. Substitute) (thirty
miles); H.B. 1270, 94th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007) (fifty miles); H.B. 2123, 94th
Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008) (fifty miles); H.B. 369, 95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2009) (fifty miles).
60. When Missouri changed its relocation law in 1998, fathers’ rights advocate Senator
McKenna proposed that there be an absolute prohibition from relocating the residence of a child
further than fifty miles from the child’s current residence unless there was written consent of the
other parent or an order of the court. Karen Plax & Catherine J. Barrie, 1998 Changes In
Missouri’s Family Law Statutes, 54 J. MO. B. JAN.– FEB. 1998 at 330. But the Missouri Bar and
the legislature considered “[a] specific mileage restriction on a custodial parent’s relocation of a
child within the state [to be] arbitrary, unreasonable and probably unconstitutional. However,
some limitation on intrastate relocation was appropriate.” Id. This view focuses solely on the
area where a court could restrict a parent’s movement, and ignores the possibility of creating a
mileage area where a custodial parent could presumptively be entitled to move without court
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Missouri’s relocation laws were modeled after the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyer’s (“AAML”) Proposed Relocation Act.61 Missouri law
requires that parents provide notice by certified mail with return receipt62 of a
proposed relocation at least sixty days before the date of the proposed
relocation.63 The notice must give the proposed new address (or city if the
exact address is unknown), telephone number, date of the move, the reasons
for the relocation, and a proposal for revised schedule of custody.64 There is a
continuing duty to update the information as it changes.65
If a parent fails to give the required statutory notice, the consequences may
be drastic. Failure to provide notice can be a factor in deciding whether
custody should be modified,66 a basis for ordering the child to return,67 or as
cause for requiring the relocating parent to pay the objecting party’s attorney’s
fees and expenses.68 Additionally, failure to provide notice may be deemed a
change in circumstances to modify custody or serve as a basis for holding the
parent in contempt,69 loss of custody of the child,70 or even criminal
penalties.71

scrutiny. The irony is, such a plan wouldbe more flexible for primary custodial parents who were
seeking to relocate since it presumably gives them permission to move within fifty miles of the
previous residence. The current law, with no guidance given to mileage, allows courts to restrict
parents from moving even within fifty miles. See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 4–11.
Although arbitrary, courts often consider mileage requirements when fashioning visitation
schedules. For example, see the widely used court-approved visitation form, which presumes that
a non-domiciliary parent should not receive mid-week visitation unless the parent lives within a
fifty-mile radius of the child. MO. SUP. CT., COURT APPROVED PARENTING TIME FORM 68-A
“SCHEDULE J,” available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=3673.
61. Plax & Barrie, supra note 60, at 330; American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
Proposed Model Relocation Act, An Act Relating to the Relocation of the Principle Residence of a
Child, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW 1, 6–11 (1998) [hereafter Model Relocation Act].
62. No court, however, has required that the notice meet these technical requirements. See
Kingsbury, supra note 34, at 86; Kell v. Kell, 53 S.W.3d 203, 208–09 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001);
Weaver v. Kelling, 53 S.W.3d 610, 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Baxley v. Jarred, 91 S.W.3d 192,
205–06 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
63. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.2 (2000).
64. Id. § 452.377.2 (1–4).
65. Id. § 452.377.3.
66. Id. § 452.377.5(1).
67. Id. § 452.377.5(2).
68. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.5 (3) (2000).
69. Id. § 452.377.12; Chris Ford, Untying the Relocation Knot: Recent Developments and a
Model for Change, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 8 (1997); Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 794 &
n.11.
70. See Pastis, supra note 45, at 419; Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 794 & n.13.
71. See Ford, supra note 69, at 8–9 (noting that moving in violation of the court order could
be deemed a criminal violation of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act); Bowermaster, supra
note 40, at 794 & n.12 (citing cases where fines or imprisonment were imposed).
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If the non-relocating parent wishes to object to the relocation, he or she
must file an objection with the court within thirty days of receipt of the
relocation notice accompanied by an affidavit explaining the specific reasons
why the court should prohibit relocation.72 The party seeking to relocate must,
in response, file an affidavit within fourteen days, supporting the reasons for
the relocation and suggest a revised parenting plan.73 If the non-relocating
parent does not file an objection within thirty days, the parent has waived his
or her right to object to the relocation and the primary custodial parent is
allowed to relocate without court approval.74 If, however, the non-custodial
parent files an objection within thirty days, the custodial parent is not allowed
to move until the court renders a decision.75
In contested relocations, the custodial parent wishing to move bears the
burden of proving that the relocation is made in good faith and is the child’s
best interests.76 Although the statute does not define “good faith,”77 the court
has defined good faith, for purposes of the relocation statute, as the “relocating
parent’s motive or purpose for relocating being something other than to disrupt
or deprive the non-relocating parent contact with the children.”78 In essence,
the court has defined good faith as a lack of bad faith.
The issue of when relocation is in the child’s best interests is more
complex. Before the passage of Missouri’s 1998 relocation statute, Missouri
courts developed a four-factor test to determine whether a relocation should be
allowed. The courts considered:
(1) [T]he prospective advantages of the move in improving the general quality
of life for the custodial parent and child, (2) the integrity of the custodial
parent’s motives in relocating (whether primarily to defeat or frustrate
visitation and whether the custodial parent is likely to comply with substitute
visitation orders), (3) the integrity of the noncustodial parent’s motives for
opposing relocation and the extent to which it is intended to secure a financial
advantage with respect to continuing child support, and (4) the realistic
opportunity for visitation which can provide an adequate basis for preserving
and fostering the noncustodial parent’s relationship with the child if relocation
79
is permitted.

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Baxley v Jarred, 91 S.W.3d 192, 205–06 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
75. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.7 (2000).
76. Id. § 452.377.9.
77. See MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (2000).
78. Swisher v. Swisher, 124 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
79. Michel v. Michel, 834 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Haralambie
Handling Child Custody Cases, § 7.08 (1983)).
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After the 1998 change in the statute, lower courts modified the Michel test.80
In 2001, however, the Missouri Supreme Court declared that the Michel test
was inconsistent with the new statute and that the new statute only required
that courts consider: (1) if the move is in the child’s best interest; (2) if it is
made in good faith; and (3) it complies with the statute.81 Missouri trial courts
now apply the eight “best interests” factors set forth in § 452.375.2 when
making decisions for initial custody placement or modifications:
(1) The wishes of the child’s parents as to custody and the proposed
parenting plan submitted by both parties;
(2) The needs of the child for a frequent, continuing and meaningful
relationship with both parties and the ability and willingness of
parents to actively perform their functions as mother and father for the
needs of the child;
(3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents,
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s
best interests;
(4) Which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent, continuing,
and meaningful contact with the other parent;
(5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community
(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved, including
any history of abuse of any individuals involved . . . .;
(7) The intention of either parent to relocate the principle residence of the
child; and
(8) The wishes of a child as to the child’s custodian82
Although residence restrictions on a parent’s relocation with the children
were initially based on concerns about parental kidnapping and forum
shopping, many of these concerns were alleviated by uniform laws governing
the jurisdiction of child custody actions.83 The more modern reason for
Missouri’s joint custody preference and relocation restrictions is the belief that
children need frequent and continuous contact with two parents to thrive and to
mitigate the damage of divorce.84 Some scholars argue that it is important for
80. Sadler v. Favro, 23 S.W.3d 253, 257–58 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
81. Stowe v. Spence, 41 S.W.3d 468, 469 (Mo. 2001).
82. See, e.g., Dorman v. Dorman, 91 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); Cullison v.
Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 511–12 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Abernathy v. Meier, 45 S.W.3d 917, 924
(Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
83. See Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 797–98.
84. See MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.2 (2000); Edwin J. Terry et al., Relocation: Moving
Forward or Moving Backward?, 31 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 983, 1013 (2000) (citing Frank F.
Furstenberg, Jr. & Andrew J. Cherlin, THE FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY 73 (1991)); but see
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both the mother and the father to continue to co-parent their children to
minimize the disruption divorce has caused.85 Others argue that forcing
children to endure prolonged court battles that their parents wage over
relocation and preventing mothers from pursuing their post-divorce goals
threatens lasting psychological as well as economic damage upon both the
mother and the child.86
II. DEBATE OVER RELOCATION STANDARDS
About half of all American children spend approximately five years in a
single-parent household.87 Divorce creates a crisis in a child’s life that causes
the child to grieve for the loss of their intact family.88 A child’s post-divorce
experiences and the way adults manage those experiences have a pronounced
impact on a child’s personality and ability to establish adult relationships.89
Psychologists have found several key factors that can improve or hinder a
child’s distress after divorce.90 The most important consideration is the impact
the psychological health and parenting practices of the custodial parent
(usually the mother) can have on the child.91 Fathers, too, may make important
contributions to the financial, social, and emotional well-being of children;
although “the contribution is not made through a man’s sheer physical

infra, notes 95–112 and accompanying text (discussing the psychological research that refutes
that frequent contact with a parent is at always at the core of the child’s best interests).
85. Terry et al., supra note 84, at 1013 (citing Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Andrew J.
Cherlin, THE FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY 73 (1991)); Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at
311.
86. See, e.g., id. at 307–15.
87. Bruch, supra note 34, at 282 (citing Marsha K. Pruett et al., Critical Aspects of
Parenting Plans for Young Children: Interjecting Data into the Debate About Overnights, 42
FAM. CT. REV. 39, 39 (2004)).
88. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision at 3, In re
Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004) (No. S107355) (citing PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN
BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL (1997)); E.
MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED
111–14 (2002); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN, ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25
YEAR LANDMARK STUDY xxviii–xxx (2000).
89. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision, supra note 88,
at 4 (citing HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 88, at 10 (2002)); Wallerstein & Tanke, supra
note 38, at 308–10.
90. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision, supra note 88,
at 4.
91. Id. at 4–5 (citing Eleanor Maccoby, Divorce and Custody: the Rights, Needs, and
Obligations of Mother, Father, and Child, in THE INDIVIDUAL, THE FAMILY, AND SOCIAL GOOD:
PERSONAL FULFILLMENT IN TIMES OF CHANGE 135, 164–65 (Gary Melton ed., 1995);
HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 88, at 126.
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presence”92 but rather, through the “quality of the relationship [with the
child].”93
Many courts have started to realize that what is good for the custodial
parent (typically the mother), is often good for the child.94 Studies have found
that effective parenting by the custodial parent is the single best line of defense
against the stressors a child faces in post-divorce life.95
In contrast, inter-parental hostility and aggression is the single most
destructive force in the lives of children of divorce.96 Consistent hostility and
aggression undermines a child’s sense of safety, which in turn prevents the
child from maintaining a positive attitude toward future life experiences and
can contribute to anxiety and phobias.97 In fact, frequent contact and
transitions between warring parents is likely to aggravate a child’s suffering,
rather than to promote his or her best interests.98 For this reason, family law
scholars have noted that when parents are hostile or violent, a distant move

92. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision, supra note 88,
at 7 (quoting HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 88, at 9).
93. Id. at 6–7; Robert D. Hess & Kathleen A. Camara, Post-Divorce Family Relationships as
Mediating Factors in the Consequences of Divorce for Children, 35 J. SOC. ISSUES 79, 94 (1979).
A statistically significant correlation exists between the duration of visits that children spent with
their father and the quality of their relationship with the father. Id. There is, however,
statistically significant correlation between the frequency of visitation. Id. Thus, the
relationships between children and their fathers can be promoted and maintained even with
variations in distance and frequency of visitation, as long as the quality of their visitation time
was maintained. See id.
94. See Bruch, supra note 34, at 288–89. Bruch argues that moves that improve the
custodial parent’s life often improve the quality of life for the child because a custodial parent’s
good parenting abilities “is the most effective protection for a child’s post-divorce well-being”
and that children’s adult opportunities are often “shaped by their mothers’ post-divorce financial
circumstances.” Id. Some courts have also realized this. For example, in Arkansas, the court has
found that “compelling job opportunities or the chance to finish an education provide a real
advantage to the children and custodial parent.” Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856,
860 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002). Additionally, the court found that “the choice and opportunity to be a
stay-at-home parent can be a compelling job opportunity providing a real advantage to the
children . . . and that ‘psychological and emotional aspects of relocation can be as advantageous
as economic or educational aspects.’” Id. (citing Parker v. Parker, 55 S.W.3d 773, 779 (Ark.
2001)).
95. Bruch, supra note 34, at 289 (citing HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 88, at 88).
96. See Janet M. Bowermaster, Relocation Custody Disputes Involving Domestic Violence,
46 U. KAN. L. REV. 433, 433 (1998); Brief Supporting Affirmance of Ct. App,’s Decision, at 9, In
re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004) (No. S107355); Bruch, supra note 34, at 291.
97. See Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision, supra note
88, at 9; Bowermaster, supra note 96 at 433; Bruch, supra note 34, at 291.
98. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision, supra note 88,
at 9–10 (citing Janet R. Johnston, Research Update: Children’s Adjustment in Sole Custody
Compared to Joint Custody Families and Principles for Custody Decision Making, 33 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 415, 420–21 (1995)).
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may actually be better for the child because it may limit the child’s exposure to
his or her parents’ negative interactions.99 Certainly most, if not all, of the
relocation cases that reach Missouri courts involve highly conflicted parents
since a court does not even become involved in a parent’s relocation unless the
non-custodial parent objects to the relocation.100
Even though children’s exposure to their parents’ hostility and violence
has serious emotional and psychological consequences, many states often
prevent custodial parents from escaping abusive situations through relocation
laws which contain no exceptions for custodial parents fleeing domestic
violence.101 As a result of relocation restrictions, a parent fleeing domestic
violence may have her child taken away from her and transferred to the
abusive parent.102 Victims of domestic violence are likely overrepresented in
relocation disputes.103 In some relocation cases, domestic violence is a factor
even when not alleged by the victim.104
99. See Jacqueline M. Valdespino, Making the “Must Move” Case at Trial: Arguing that
Relocation is Right for the Kids, 28 FAM. ADVOC. 19, 22 (2006); Janet R. Johnston et al.,
Ongoing Postdivorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint Custody and Frequent Access, 59 AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 576, 583 (1989) (finding that where children of high–conflict parents had
more frequent access to both parents and more frequent transitions between the parents, they were
most likely to be clinically disturbed).
100. See Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 796–97.
101. Bowermaster, supra note 96, at 433. Missouri’s relocation statute provides that in
certain exceptional circumstances the notice requirements of the statute may be waived to protect
the health and safety of a child or adults, and the the court may take remedial action it considers
necessary to “considers necessary to facilitate the legitimate needs of the parties and the best
interest of the child.” MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.4 (2008). It is not entirely clear, however, from
the statute how a parent should proceed in seeking the court to waive the notice requirements.
One interpretation would be that the parent would have to obtain a waiver from the court before
relocating. It is not clear whether the court may grant a waiver of the notice requirements after
the parent has already relocated for safety reasons. Even so, most parents would be wary of
relocating first and seeking waiver of notice after the relocation. If the court does not agree that
the parent’s situation was an “exceptional circumstance,” the parent may face a variety of civil
and/or criminal sanctions for removing the child from the state, including the possibility that the
court would transfer custody of the child to the abusive parent. See Id. § 452.377.12 (2008).
102. Bowermaster, supra note 96, at 433.
103. About one-half of all custody cases involve domestic violence, and domestic violence is
frequently found in “high conflict” cases. Couples in high conflict cases are more likely to seek
court intervention. As a result, Bowermaster hypothesizes that many relocation disputes that
make themselves to court will involve domestic violence victims. Bowermaster, supra note 96, at
437.
104. See id. at 436 n.9. Attorneys may discourage clients from disclosing domestic violence
in custody suits for fear that judges will be angered and believe the allegations of abuse were
raised only to gain a tactical advantage. Id. (citing Jane W. Ellis, Plans, Protections, and
Professional Intervention: Innovations in Divorce Custody Reform and the Role of Legal
Professionals, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 65, 152–66 (1990); Merry Hofford et al., Family
Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q.
197, 217 (1995)).
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Even without a history of domestic violence, conflict between a child’s
parents can be serious enough to cause psychological trauma to a child.105
Generally speaking, children caught in the middle of high-conflict custody
disputes are two-to-five times more likely to have clinical levels of
psychological disturbance.106 When joint custody arrangements are imposed
on warring parents, they often maintain or increase conflict between the
parents and hinder a child’s development.107
Relocation restrictions are most often justified as intended to promote and
maintain frequent and meaningful contact with both parents.108 If that is the
goal, however, relocation restrictions fail to provide the solution. As discussed
in Part III, Section E, courts often “blackmail” custodial parents from
relocating by threatening to change custody to the non-custodial parent if the
custodial parent goes through with the relocation.109 But if the court does not
succeed in the “blackmail game” and the custodial parent moves her residence
anyway—without the child—the custodial parent, the parent that until now has
been the primary caretaker of the child, is now denied “frequent and continuing
contact” with the child.110 In such a scenario, the child now faces two types of
difficult transitions—moving to a new residence and potentially a new town
and school district to live with the non-custodial parent, and losing the day-today relationship with the custodial parent.111
At any rate, forcing parents to live near one another does not necessarily
ensure that the child will be spared from emotional turmoil. Similarly, forcing
parents to frequently communicate and share custody of their children does not
increase the likelihood that they will cooperate with one another.112 It is rare

105. E.g., Robert E. Emery, Parental Alienation Syndrome: Proponents Bear the Burden of
Proof, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 8, 11–12 (2005); Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Andrew J. Cherlin,
Divided Families: What Happens to Children When Parents Part, in THE FAMILY IN PUBLIC
POLICY at 106–7 (Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Andrew J. Cherlin eds.) (1991); HETHERINGTON &
KELLY, supra note 88, at 138; ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE
CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 284–85 (1992). See generally Bruch, supra
note 34, at 291–92 (summarizing this research).
106. Janet R. Johnston et al., The Psychological Functioning of Alienated Children in Custody
Disputing Families: An Explanatory Study, 23 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 39, 55 (2005); see also
Bruch, supra note 34, at 291 n. 35 (critiquing Johnson’s summary in Family Law Quarterly).
107. Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions,
5 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 267, 278–79 (1987).
108. Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at 311.
109. Caroline Ritchie Heil, Relocation Cases As Change in Custody Proceedings: “Judicial
Blackmail,” or Competing Interests Reconciled?, 51 S.C. L. REV. 885, 896 (2000).
110. Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 39, at 260.
111. Bruch, supra note 34, at 285.
112. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. App.’s Decision, supra note 88,
at 8 (citing ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND
LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 183 (1992)).
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for parents―even well-educated parents―to cooperate after a divorce.113
Psychological studies show that even parents who manage to avoid conflict
tend to do so by staying away from one another.114 Overall, the very reasons
that legislatures justify imposing relocation restrictions on custodial parents
have been called into question by the psychological community, which begs
the question: are relocation restrictions necessary at all to serve the best
interests of the child?
III. PROBLEM’S WITH MISSOURI’S RELOCATION LAW
A.

Burden of Proof

Courts are often quick to reject legitimate relocation requests if they would
complicate visitation with the non-custodial parent, often without considering
the possibility of creating a revised custody schedule which would allow for
longer, but less frequent visits.115 In Missouri, and several other states,116 the
burden of proving that the relocation is in the child’s best interests falls on the
relocating parent,117 usually the mother. If the mother does not convince the
judge that moving is in the child’s best interest, the judge will deny the
relocation and order that if the mother ultimately moves, custody of the child
will be transferred from the mother to the father.118 If the mother “chooses” to
stay, however, she may retain custody of the child.119 One scholar opines that
the state imposes on the mother the “cruelest [choice] of all,” the threat of
taking her children, and “imposing a Sophie’s Choice of unconscionable
proportions.”120 In these situations, the mother may be forced to litigate even
if the father does not want custody or is not a suitable caretaker of the child.121

113. Id. In the Maccoby and Mnookin study, only 29% of Northern California parents, who
were generally well-educated, cooperated in parenting post-divorce. Id. The custody evaluator in
the landmark California relocation case In re Marriage of LaMusga has stated that, “[C]hildren of
divorce rarely have parents who support each other.” PHILIP M. STAHL, PARENTING AFTER
DIVORCE: A GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS AND MEETING YOUR CHILDREN’S NEEDS 46
(2000).
114. Brief of Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance of the Ct. of Appeal’s Decision, supra
note 91, at 8 (citing ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 183 (1992)).
115. See Paige M. Dempsey, Casenote, Joint Custody and Relocation: The Supreme Court of
Nebraska Limits Relocation of Parents Sharing Joint Custody in Brown v. Brown, 35
CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 230–31 (2001), (criticizing a Nebraska court for failing to consider
alternative visitation schedules before denying a relocation outright).
116. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 7.
117. MO. REV. STAT § 452.377.9 (2008).
118. See LaFrance, supra note 54, at 9.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Bruch, supra note 34, at 284 n.10.
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Critics argue that the burden of proof falls on the wrong person in
relocation disputes.122 Many scholars contend that the custodial parent should
have a presumptive right to move, absent a showing by the non-custodial father
that the move is not in the child’s best interests.123 These critics argue that the
mother should be allowed to rely on the trial court’s initial custody order
without fearing that a relocation request will trigger a re-evaluation of her
parenting skills.124 This notion underscores the common sentiment in child
custody law that a custody placement should not be modified unless there is a
substantial change in circumstances, to ensure that the child remains with its
primary caretaker or “psychological parent.”125 By placing the burden of proof
on the mother, mothers must overcome an enormous barrier in order to
successfully move.
B.

Practical Problems of Implementing the Law

Missouri’s law is also plagued by many practical problems which make it
extremely difficult for custodial parents to successfully relocate if the move is
contested.
1.

Parents Seeking to Relocate Cannot Get a Court Date in Time

Employers often need to make immediate personnel decisions and cannot
hold employment offers indefinitely for parents who require months to provide
statutory relocation notice and time to litigate the move.126 For parents who
have an immediate opportunity, a delayed trial date can, by default, prevent
them from obtaining the opportunity (job, education, etc.) which triggered their
request to relocate.127 Non-custodial parents can use this as leverage to delay
or even prevent the relocation.128 Even where non-custodial parents have not
caused the delay, the courts are often so backlogged that it is virtually
impossible for a mother, given the minimum required statutory relocation

122. See LaFrance, supra note 54, at 10–11.
123. See, e.g., Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at 318; Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note
39, at 255.
124. See, e.g., Ann M. Driscoll, In Search of a Standard: Resolving the Relocation Problem
in New York, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175, 211 (1997).
125. See, e.g., Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 39, at 247; Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note
39, at 318; see generally GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 51, at 11–12, 19–27, 101–07 (1996)
(describing the need for continuity between a child and their primary caregiver).
126. Glennon, supra note 38, at 136–37 (citing Kaiser v. Kaiser, 23 P.3d 278 (Okla. 2001)).
127. See Bowermaster, supra note 96, at 460 (explaining that abused parents often lose out on
employment opportunities because they have a short time for accepting an employment offer
(about thity days) but often have to wait months for a relocation hearing).
128. Id. at 460.
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notice (sixty days), to receive a trial court ruling before the day she was set to
relocate.129
In virtually all cases, a significant trial delay can prejudice or
inconvenience the custodial parent, but the situation becomes much more
drastic in domestic violence situations. Janet Bowermaster tells a compelling
story about Deb C., a victim of physical, sexual, and verbal abuse.130 Deb’s
husband not only attacked her but also severely attacked police officers sent in
to help Deb.131 Deb’s husband stalked, harassed, threatened, and attacked her
in public and she feared for her life.132 In all, it took over two and a half years
after Deb filed for divorce before she was allowed to move away from her
violent husband,133 and she was told that if she relocated without court
approval, she would be prosecuted under federal kidnapping laws and her
husband would get custody of their son.134 Such lengthy delays are not an
aberration in relocation disputes. Several Missouri cases indicate a clear
problem in receiving a timely hearing.135 In one case, it took over a year after
the custodial mother sent her relocation notice before the trial court heard the
case.136 It took another year before the appellate court rendered its decision.137
Missouri needs to ensure parents seeking time-sensitive relocations that their
cases will be quickly resolved.
2.

Trial Courts Expect Relocating Parents to Produce Evidence at Trial
Which is Impracticable or Impossible

Missouri’s relocation statute requires parents to give notice of the proposed
new address, if known.138 Pragmatic parents realizing that the court may find
relocation is not in the child’s best interest and ultimately prevent the move
will often not be able to provide an exact future address until after the

129. Consider Shelly Osia who gave seventy-six days notice of her relocation (sixteen days
more than was required by law). Even with a relatively quick trial date, Shelly did not get a
hearing until almost a month after she was slated to relocate. It took another month for the judge
to issue his ruling. It took over another year before the appellate court rendered its decision. In
all, the ordeal took about a year and a half to resolve. See Appellant’s Brief at 5, Osia v. Osia,
260 S.W.3d 438, (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Osia v. Osia, 260 S.W.3d 438, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
130. See Bowermaster, supra note 96, at 433–35.
131. Id. at 433.
132. Id. at 433–34.
133. Id. at 435.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Ratteree v. Will, 258 S.W.3d 864, 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Schlotman v.
Costa, 193 S.W.3d 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
136. Johnston v. Dunham, 172 S.W.3d 442, 442–45 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). In Johnston, trial
did not occur until over a year after the mother’s relocation notice. Id. at 144. The appellate
court issued a decision over two years after the request to relocate. Id. at 442.
137. Id.
138. See MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.1 (2008).
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relocation has been granted. Most parents lack the financial resources to buy a
home or risk breaking a lease if the court refuses to allow them to relocate.139
As a result, these parents will often list only the city on their relocation notice,
with the idea that they will finalize their housing decision after they have
permission to move.140 Similarly, parents cannot accurately predict which
school district or daycare their child will attend. For children attending public
schools, the districts will be determined by the geographic area where the
parent lives. For children who will be attending private school or daycare,
many programs have limited openings and require a deposit to hold a child’s
slot. Many parents may not take the financial risk of paying for these
programs unless they know their child will be certain to attend.
Yet courts have ignored these obvious realities. Courts will often find that
a parent’s move is not in the child’s best interest if the mother cannot prove
where they will be living, what the neighborhood is like, what school the child
will attend, or how long their daily commute will be.141 The result may be
discrimination against relocating parents with low incomes. Wealthier
individuals could perhaps afford to buy a new home or to break a lease on an
apartment if they were not allowed to move. This option, however, may not be
available for most litigants.
Likewise, courts usually refuse to grant a parent permission to relocate for
employment if the employment offer is not concrete.142 This ignores the

139. Consider that Shelly Osia had already purchased a new home, and sold her old home
while the relocation was pending. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 10. After the trial court
refused to allow her to move, she presumably had to find a new place to live. Certainly, many
parents seeking relocation familiar with Shelly’s plight would be wary of purchasing a new home
or selling their current home until they had assurance that they could relocate.
140. See Fohey v. Knickerbocker, 130 S.W. 3d 730, 735 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (mother
delayed housing decisions until the relocation was approved by the court).
141. See id.:
In addition to providing no evidence regarding Myranda’s new home, mother also
presented no evidence about Myranda’s new neighborhood, nor what recreational
opportunities would be available to Myranda in her new neighborhood. Mother explains
that she was deferring such decisions until she had received court approval to relocate.
While we can appreciate her position, it was mother’s burden to show that the move was
in Myranda’s best interest. And thus, it would have behooved mother to provide the trial
court with some evidence as to Myranda’s proposed living environment.
See also Wilson v. Wilson, 873 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (“Mother provided no plan
for living arrangements which would provide a stable environment for [child] in Rhode Island.
That alone is sufficient to support the denial of mother’s request to remove [child] to Rhode
Island.”); Koenig v. Koenig, 782 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (finding it was not in child’s
best interest to move with mother to New Hampshire to live with mother’s new husband, noting
that the mother provided little evidence about the proposed living arrangements); Samuels v.
Samuels, 713 S.W.2d 865, 869–70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
142. See, e.g., Lowery v. Lowery, 287 S.W.3d 693, 695–96 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (“Mother
also did not have a job in Florida, but testified that she believed she could obtain employment at
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reality that employers, familiar with the uphill battle relocating parents face,
may refuse to give a firm offer of employment to parents who cannot relocate
without the consent of the court or the other parent.143 Courts should refrain
from requiring parents to prove facts that they realistically cannot.
Sometimes other evidence produced at trial is of little value in determining
whether a move is beneficial. For example, judges often hear evidence about
the comparison of schools, parks, weather, and sometimes even factors such as
crime rates and air quality.144 In fact, one article targeted at family law
practitioners advises them of the advantages of presenting evidence of better
schools, a bigger home, less traffic, less crime, and better extracurricular
activities through photographs or videos.145 But things such as schools, parks,
or crime rates are rarely the reason why the parent sought to move in the first
place.146 Nor are they usually the reasons for a non-custodial parent’s
objection to the move.147
As Janet Bowermaster points out, non-custodial parents do not contest
relocations out of concern that their children will be living in a small town, or
that their new school will have fewer academic choices, or there are fewer
cultural opportunities for the child to experience,148 although non-custodial
parents often raise such issues in relocation litigation. Such evidence is not
useful and requires parents to do nothing more than play to the judge’s
personal preferences.149 If judges were forced to decide all cases based on
superfluous evidence, they would presumably allow every move to Maine,

the Publix grocery store where she had worked previously.”); Buck v. Buck, 279 S.W.3d 547,
551 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) ( acknowledging the move would improve quality of the mother’s home
and found that the general quality of the mother or children’s lives would be improved because
the mother lacked employment);Vaughn v. Bowman, 209 S.W.3d 509, 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)
(affirming the move was not in the child’s best interest where the step-father may be required to
move for a position at the fire department, but at the time of trial, no position was available);
Samuels v. Samuels, 713 S.W.2d 865, 869–70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (criticizing the mother’s plans
as “too speculative” and noting that she didn’t “have a definite job”).
143. Glennon, supra note 38, at 136 (citing In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135 (Colo.
2005) (finding that the employerwas unwilling to make offer until parent stated intent to
relocate)).
144. Duggan, supra note 44, at 199.
145. See Valdespino, supra note 99, at 20–24.
146. Duggan, supra note 44, at 198.
147. Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 799; Bruch, supra note 34, at 282. Bruch notes that the
usual reasons for objections to relocation are fears that less time with the child or less frequent
interactions with the child will weaken the parent–child relationship and concerns about the
quality of the custodial parent’s caretaking skills. Id. More nebulous reasons such as the
potential inconvenience and cost of travel for visitation, or an attempt to control or battle with the
custodial parent provide additional reasons for resisting relocation. Id.
148. Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 799.
149. Duggan, supra note 44, at 199.
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considered the most child-healthy state, and reject every move to Mississippi,
the most child-unhealthy state.150
Courts should create evidentiary rules to exclude such statistical evidence
unless the parties can link it to actual child improvement or diminishment. For
example, the same evidence may be admissible if, say, there had been a rash of
violent crimes within the neighborhood where the child will reside, if moving
to a new city with air pollution problems would exacerbate a child’s medical
condition, or if evidence showed that changing school districts would offer
more resources to assist a child’s unique educational needs.151
Creating evidentiary standards which limit the introduction of these
problematic types of evidence would be helpful in ensuring that family court
judges decide a case based on its actual merits rather than illusory “crime
rates” or the implication that a relocating parent has not diligently prepared for
the move because she cannot provide an exact address.
3.

Relocation Decisions Evade Meaningful Review

Another important factor, which propounds the errors of the trial court, is
that relocation decisions often evade meaningful appellate review.152 Often by
the time a case has reached an appellate court, the litigant has abandoned the
very opportunity that created her request to relocate.153 Moreover, it is often
prohibitively expensive to appeal child custody cases. Parents who are
financially struggling, or seeking to relocate for economic reasons, usually
mothers, are often prevented from appealing decisions that they believe are
erroneous.154
150. Id. (citing THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, KIDS COUNT (2006), available at
http://www.aecf.org/kidscount/).
151. For example, in Osia, evidence showing that the new school district had programs to
better accommodate the Osia sons’ learning disabilities should be admissible because it is not a
statistical composite of information, but rather, information directly affecting the children’s
needs. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 2, at 9.
152. Glennon, supra note 38, at 136 (“[C]ases that reach an appellate decision are most likely
only a small percentage of custodial parents who want to relocate but who are unable to effectuate
their choice.”); Sylvia A. Law & Patricia Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of Family Law,
69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 345, 351 (1993).
153. See supra notes 157–60 and accompanying text.
154. Glennon, supra note 38, at 137 (“The expense custodial parents must assume in order to
litigate their right to relocate may also prevent parents from seeking judicial permission to
relocate.”). The Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice reported tremendous problems in
family law regarding financial impediment to the courts. Missouri Task Force on Gender &
Justice, Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 MO. L. REV. 485, 528–29
(1993). Although the Task Force published its results in 1993, little has changed in the family
court system, and no other task force has been created to investigate the problems. Id. The Task
Force found that the “lack of financial resources [is] a serious problem in access to the courts in
family law matters” and that litigants, most often women, yield on promising claims because of
lack of financial resources. Id. A former chairman of the Missouri Bar Family Law Section
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Appellate courts themselves cannot settle on a uniform method to evaluate
trial court errors in relocation cases and often create a hodge-podge of
appellate decisions which reflect no apparent rule governing relocation. For
example, in Osia v. Osia, the appellate court refused to reverse a trial court’s
ruling that a mother could not move thirty-four miles away from her previous
residence, even though the father’s objections to the relocation were tenuous at
best.155 But in In re Marriage of Williams, handed down a year earlier, the
appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court denying mother’s motion
to relocate.156 The appellate court reasoned that the distance was only fiftyfive miles away and that it would be unrealistic to inflexibly confine her to a
geographic area, even though the move was across state lines.157 Certainly if
dissolution and child custody cases reveal the “greatest opportunity to observe
and judge the fairness of our courts’ operations,” then these inconsistent and
biased rulings show that our courts are failing in its “institutional obligation to
ensure litigants fair and effective access to the courts and to render decisions
grounded in economic and psychological realities of the family unit . . . .”158
Finally, the standard of appellate review is often very high—in most states,
it is “abuse of discretion.”159 The high level of deference to trial court
decisions has been criticized as encouraging “inconsistency and arbitrariness”
in relocation cases.160 Because a “best interest” determination necessarily
involves a very subjective evaluation by the trial judge and a weighing of the
credibility of the parties, most appellate courts lack a meaningful way of
determining whether the trial court committed error.161 Discouraged by this
high standard of proof, very few litigants appeal their child custody and
relocation cases.162

testified that economic control can often be determinative of who will succeed in family law
cases. Id. One attorney remarked, “How many clients can afford $5,000.00, $10,000.00 to
appeal a case?” Id. at 539–40.
155. See Osia, 260 S.W.3d at 438; Appellant’s Brief at 7, Osia v. Osia, 260 S.W.3d 438, (Mo.
Ct. App. 2008); see supra notes and accompanying text 26–29 discussing the father’s objections
to the relocation.
156. In re Marriage of Williams, 220 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
157. Id.
158. Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 527.
159. See Law & Hennessey, supra note 152, at 351; Hon. Arline S. Rotman et. al.,
Reconciling Parents’ and Children’s Interests in Relocation: In Whose Best Interests?, 38 FAM.
& CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 341, 364–65 (2000); Task Force on Gender and Justice, supra note
154, at 540.
160. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 57–58.
161. Law & Hennessey, supra note 152, at 350–51; see infra notes 173–82 and accompanying
text.
162. Law & Hennessey, supra note 152, at 351; see also LaFrance, supra note 54, at 57–58
(stating the appellate deference discourages “the very appeals which might rationalize
outcomes”).
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C. Best Interest Standards
Missouri appellate court decisions regarding relocation lack a consistent
rule to confirm or deny locations.163 Even decisions within one appellate
district often contradict each other.164 The result is that the outcome of a
custodial parent’s relocation request may largely depend on the appellate
district in which the custodial parent resides.165 One author criticizing
Missouri’s scheme opined: “If the only predictability in the system is the fact
that one division will more likely grant relocation than another, the state has
failed to enact a statutory and judicial decision-making scheme that is just and
supportive of the new family unit.”166 Missouri is not the only state whose
relocation law lacks consistency and uniformity. Nationally, there is no
uniform approach to how states deal with relocation disputes, leading to
confusion and unpredictability regarding how courts will rule on any given
issue.167
Part of the problem underscoring the lack of uniformity is the standard
used to decide relocation disputes. Missouri, like every other jurisdiction
deciding relocation disputes, uses the “best interests of the child” to make
relocation decisions.168 Professor Bowermaster, noting the irony that every
jurisdiction uses the same test with widely divergent outcomes, argues that the
test can serve no real purpose as a decisional guideline.169 Statutes governing
relocation often list factors courts should consider when determining the best
interests of the child, including age, special needs, and the health of the parties

163. Ford, supra note 69, at 35. Compare Osia v. Osia, 260 S.W.3d 438, 438 (Mo. Ct. App.
2008) (denying relocation 25 miles away) with In re Williams, 220 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2007) (overturning trial court’s decision to refuse relocation when mother was only seeking
to move 55 miles away since “relocation would [not] prohibit Father from continuing his active
role in the child’s life.”) with Kell v. Kell, 53 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that
a mother’s move from Missouri to Florida was in the child’s best interest).
164. Ford, supra note 69, at 36–40.
165. Id. at 40.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Amie J. Tracia, Navigating the Waters of Massachusetts Child Relocation Law:
Assessing the Application of the Real Advantage Standard, 13 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC.
139, 141 (2008); Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 217 (N.J. 2001); Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d
145, 149 (N.Y. 1996) (criticizing previous relocation regime as “difficult to apply”); Ford, supra
note 69, at 19 (noting that open-ended best interest analyses have led to a lack of uniformity and
reliability in many courts); Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434, 437 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“our
research has failed to reveal a consistent, universally accepted approach to the question of when a
custodial parent may relocate out-of-state over the objection of the non-custodial parent. . . .
Across the country, applicable standards remain distressingly disparate.”); Hollandsworth v.
Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856, 863 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002).
168. Bowermaster, supra note 40, at 799.
169. Id.
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and children.170 But most statutes do not prioritize the factors171 and may
allow the court to consider any other factor that the court deems relevant.172
The standard creates an Orwellian scenario in which every decision of the
custodial parent is examined under a microscope.173 The judge and the noncustodial parent serve as Big Brother, examining every large and small choice
the custodial parent, usually the mother, makes. As discussed in Part III,
Section D, such intrusion into private family life implicates constitutional
concerns.
The best interests standard gives judges extremely broad discretion,174 so
much so that the test has been called “a euphemism for unbridled judicial
discretion”175 and “a vague platitude [rather] than a legal or scientific standard”
that is subject to abuse by judges who use it to further their own interests.176
Many commentators have half-seriously suggested that when both parents are
fit caretakers, it is likely to be just as accurate to flip a coin to decide custody
than it is to use vague and ambiguous “best interest” standards.177
This vagueness allows divorce courts to “pay lip-service” to the standard
as a way of masking bias.178
Judges, too, express discomfort using the best interests test.179 For
example, Judge Gary Crippen has attacked the doctrine on grounds that it
170. Charlow, supra note 107, at 268.
171. Id.
172. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (2000) (specifying various factors to consider but not
limiting courts analysis to those factors.)
173. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 136 (quoting Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of
Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 816–17 (1985)).
174. See, e.g., Rotman et. al., supra note 159, at 364–65; Ford, supra note 69, at 3.
175. Charlow, supra note 107, at 269.
176. Id. at 267; Katherine C. Sheehan, Post-Divorce Child Custody and Family Relocation, 9
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 135, 138 (1986) (calling the best interests test “intrusive, unworkable, and
indeterminate”).
177. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 257–62 (1975); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET. AL.,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 153 n.12 (1973); Duggan, supra note 44, at 193
(suggesting that playing rock, paper, scissors to determine relocation cases is likely to be just as
accurate as using traditional vague best interest factors).
178. Alexandra Selfridge, Equal Protection and Gender Preference in Divorce Contests Over
Custody, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 170–71 (2007); Law & Hennessey, supra note 153,
at 350–51. See also Rotman et al., supra note 160, at 364 (arguing that judges use their own
experiences when considering the child’s best interests and explaining that “[e]very judge, no
matter how conscientious, brings his or her particular point of view into the courtroom” which
makes the best interest standard very subjective); Charlow, supra note 107, at 262 (arguing the
standard is marred by personal and cultural bias)..
179. Charlow, supra note 107, at 269, 270 (citing Charnas, Practice Trends in Divorce
Related Child Custody, 4 J. DIVORCE 57 (1981)); Eleanor E. Maccoby, Editorial, A Cogent Case
for a New Child Custody Standard, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. i, i (2005) (“Judges . . . [find] it
well-nigh impossible to determine which of two contesting parents can best support the children’s
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“risks unwise results, stimulates litigation, permits manipulation and abuse,
and allows a level of judicial discretion that is difficult to reconcile with an
historic commitment to the rule of law.”180
Overall, the best interest of the child analysis creates an “exhaustive,
intrusive, and expensive investigation of [one’s life] and plans.”181 The test
encourages litigation: since neither side can predict the outcome, parties
overestimate their chance of success and are more willing to litigate.182 By
implication, the increased likelihood of litigation also increases the price tag of
the legal bill.183 On the other hand, parties may likewise agree to “bad”
settlements rather than risk uncertain results in litigation.184 Missouri lacks a
test that limits the scope of judicial inquiry while adequately weighing a
child’s interests.
D. Constitutional Problems
Missouri’s relocation law is vulnerable to many constitutional attacks—
among them, the right to travel, the right to marry, and the right to family
privacy. Consider the story of Cynthia Buchheit as an example of
constitutional issues at stake in Missouri’s relocation law.185 In 2006, after a
contentious divorce and modification, Ms. Buchheit notified her ex-husband,
Ricardo Berkbigler, of her intent to relocate with the couple’s child.186 The
relocation notice sent by Ms. Buchheit came after a contentious modification
long-term well-being.”); Task Force on Gender and Justice, supra note 154, at 539 (explaining
that Missouri judges often feel discomfort in making decisions on private family matters and feel
difficultly deciding cases when there is “no clear legal solution”).
180. Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody
Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker
Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 499–500 (1990) (internal citation omitted); see also Robert
Pfenning, Note and Comment, The Best Interests of the Child: Do the Courts’ Subjective Factors
in Determining “Best Interests” Really Benfit the Child?, 17 J. JUV. L. 117, 128 (1996) (arguing
that judges manipulate statutory factors to interject their personal biases in a way that is unlikely
to be reversed on appeal).
181. Sheehan, supra note 176, at 137.
182. Charlow, supra note 107, at 270; see also Ford, supra note 69, at 2–4 (recalling a case
where the state’s relocation law afforded judges significant discretion, and choosing the litigation
strategy was difficult because of the uncertain consequences of seeking court permission to
relocate); Maccoby, supra note 179, at i.
183. Duggan, supra note 44, at 194–95; see id. at 197 (arguing that the money spent in
relocation disputes violates a cardinal rule of economics—that it is not worth proceeding when
marginal costs exceed marginal gains).
184. Charlow, supra note 107, at 273; See e.g. Ford, supra note 69, at 4–5 (noting that the
unpredictable outcome puts women at a weaker negotiating position, and increases the likelihood
that women will make concessions they otherwise would not make in order to move).
185. Brief for Appellant at 2–4, Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 89113 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. Sept.
17, 2007), 2007 WL 3054639.
186. Id.
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proceeding, less than a year after the divorce, in which Ms. Buchheit was
granted sole legal custody of the minor child because the parties could not
communicate with one another.187
Ms. Buchheit’s proposed relocation would have taken her from her
parent’s home in Perryville, Missouri to Festus, Missouri, a distance of roughly
forty-two miles.188 Ms. Buchheit’s proposed relocation was prompted by her
recent engagement to her fiancé, Mr. Courtway, who lived and worked near
Festus, her desire to move out of her parents’ home, and her need to be able to
cohabitate with her new spouse upon remarriage.189
Ms. Buchheit’s relocation was opposed by her ex-husband, Mr.
Berkbigler.190 The trial court, in reliance on the statutory factors in section
452.377, held that Ms. Buchheit’s proposed relocation of forty-two miles
would “have a significant impact on [Mr. Berkbigler’s] ability to maintain his
weekday visitations” and would be “logistically impractical” for Mr.
Berkbigler.191 The trial court also, not once, but three times, maintained that
the move was not in the best interest of the child because the move would
“limit the child’s ability to regularly care for and play with his multiple pets at
his father’s home,” and that the child’s “ability to enjoy his pets would be
diminished considerably by the loss of the mid-week visitation period.”192
Additionally, the trial court was unconvinced that “the quality of education in
the Festus school district . . . would be any better than the education the child
[was] receiving” at his current school.193 Consequently, the trial court denied
Ms. Buchheit’s relocation.194 The denial was affirmed by the Missouri Court
of Appeals Eastern District in an unpublished memorandum opinion.195
1.

Right to Travel

There is, perhaps, no more eloquent way to illustrate one’s constitutional
right to travel than the words penned by Justice Jackson in Edwards v.
California:196

187. Id. at *3.
188. Id.
189. Brief for Appellant at 2–3, 6–7, Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 89113 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D.
Sept. 17, 2007), 2007 WL 3054639; Reply Brief for Appellant at 5, Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No.
89113 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. Sept. 17, 2007), 2007 WL 4623414.
190. Brief for Respondent at 5, Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 89113 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. Oct.
16, 2007), 2007 WL 3249950.
191. Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 04PR–CV00345–01, at 2–3 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Perry County,
Nov. 16, 2006) (judgment denying petitioner’s request to relocate with the child).
192. Id. at 3–4.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 6.
195. Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 89113, slip op. at 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
196. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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This Court should . . . hold squarely that it is a privilege of citizenship of
the United States, protected from state abridgment, to enter any state of the
Union, either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of permanent
residence therein and for gaining resultant citizenship thereof. If national
197
citizenship means less than this, it means nothing.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that citizens have a constitutional
right to travel and migrate within the United States.198 As Justice Stewart
stated, this right is “not a mere conditional liberty subject to regulation and
control under conventional due process or equal protection standards . . . . [I]t
is a virtually unconditional personal right.”199 The right to travel has been
defined as guaranteed by the privileges and immunities clause.200 Some have
viewed this right as stemming from a liberty interest guaranteed by the
“[O]ur constitutional concepts of personal
Fourteenth Amendment:201
liberty . . . require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which
unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”202 Others have viewed the
right to travel through the lens of the commerce clause.203 The importance and
recognition of an individual’s right to travel predates even our own
Constitution, as this right was recognized explicitly in the Articles of
Confederation.204 While many courts have overlooked this important right in
relocation cases and statutes, the right to travel is one firmly engrained in our
nation’s history and culture.205
Missouri’s relocation law infringes upon a custodial parent’s right to travel
because it restricts the parent’s movement within a geographical area if the
197. Id. at 183(Jackson, J., concurring).
198. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642–43 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(“The constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . . has been firmly established and
repeatedly recognized.” (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966))).
199. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
200. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 183 (Jackson, J., concurring).
201. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 2 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
202. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629.
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); see Edwards,
314 U.S. at 166.
204. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, § 1; see also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67
(1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) (holding that the “unmistakable essence” of the right to travel is
found in the “document that transformed a loose confederation of States into one Nation”).
205. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1379 (2d ed. 1998) (“[The
right to travel] relates as much to the importance of lifting all artificial barriers to personal
mobility as to the virtues of an integrated national economy and society.”) (internal citation
omitted).
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parent wishes to retain custody of her child. A law which prohibits or burdens
a person’s fundamental right to travel demands strict scrutiny.206 Additionally,
if a law serves no other purpose “‘than to chill the assertion of constitutional
rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then [the law] [is]
patently unconstitutional.’”207 Missouri’s relocation law certainly qualifies as
one which “unduly burdens” an individual’s right to travel and may, in effect,
serve no other purpose than to “chill the assertion” of that very right.
Whether Missouri’s relocation law can withstand strict scrutiny requires an
examination of the compelling state interests being asserted by the state.
Certainly, Missouri would assert that it has a compelling interest in ensuring
the well-being of Missouri’s children and that such responsibility is reserved to
the management of the states.208
In Missouri, the state’s responsibility over children’s “welfare” has
essentially been incorporated into the relocation statute as a judicial
determination of whatever the court decides is in the child’s “best interest.”209
As discussed previously, however, this standard is so vague and nebulous as to
amount to little more than a mere “euphemism for unbridled judicial
discretion.”210
A good example of this can be found in Buchheit v. Berkbigler,211 the case
referenced at the beginning of this section. In Berkbigler, the trial court relied
heavily on the child’s menagerie of animals at his father’s house as a
seemingly important factor in determining what it considered to be in the
child’s best interest, holding that midweek visitation was important for the
minor child to cultivate his relationship with his pets.212 Decisions such as the
one in Berkbigler illustrate why the “best interest” standard is not definite or
narrowly tailored enough to meet strict scrutiny: even if the child were in fact
happier taking more frequent care of his animals, this would still not justify the
curtailment of Ms. Buchheit’s fundamental right to travel.
206. Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904–05 (1986).
207. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).
208. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”); see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (“Throughout our history the
several States have exercised their police powers to protect the health and safety of their
citizens.”).
209. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.8 (West 2000).
210. Charlow, supra note 107, at 269.
211. No. 04PR–CV00345–01, at 5 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Perry County, Nov. 16, 2006) (judgment
denying petitioner’s request to relocate with the child); see supra notes 211–21 and
accompanying text.
212. Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 04PR–CV00345–01, at 3–4 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Perry County,
Nov. 16, 2006) (judgment denying petitioner’s request to relocate with the child); see also Miers
v. Miers, 53 S.W.3d 592, 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that child could maintain meaningful
relationship with half-siblings only during weekend, holiday, and summer visitation with mother).
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Further, in assessing the mother’s proposed move of merely forty-two
miles, the court surely could have utilized less intrusive means to promote
frequent and meaningful contact between father and child than by denying the
mother the right to relocate her place of residence.213 The conflict between the
mother’s fundamental right to travel and the father’s right to frequent and
meaningful contact with his son was illusory. If, as the trial court said,
midweek visitation would no longer be possible, extended time over weekends
or holidays could have been procured for father in order to compensate for any
lost time. Transportation costs could have easily been reallocated to offset any
increase in expenses suffered by father as the result of mother’s move. The
court did not use the least intrusive means at its disposal to balance these
competing interests because it determined that by acting under the guise of the
child’s “best interests” it was not obligated to mitigate the harm to the rights of
either party. Placing the burden on a relocating parent to show that the
relocation is in her child’s best interests impermissibly burdens the free
exercise of that parent’s constitutional rights, and several state supreme courts
have recently reached this same conclusion.214 In Jaramillo v. Jaramillo,215
the New Mexico Supreme Court, in overturning a lower court’s decision to bar
a mother from relocating, held that “placing [a] burden on the relocating parent
and favoring the resisting parent with a corresponding presumption that
relocation is not in the child’s best interest unconstitutionally impairs the
relocating parent’s right to travel.”216 Such a burden of proof would require
the custodial parent to “prove she has a right to exercise her rights.”217
The Wyoming Supreme Court, in Watt v. Watt,218 also affirmed that a
burden placed upon the right to travel by that state’s relocation statute was
unconstitutionally permissible:
The right of travel enjoyed by a citizen carries with it the right of a custodial
parent to have the children move with that parent. This right is not to be
denied, impaired, or disparaged unless clear evidence before the court . . .
219
establishes the detrimental effect of the move upon the children.

213. Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 04PR–CV00345–01, at 6 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Perry County, Nov.
16, 2006) (denying petitioner’s request to relocate with the child).
214. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 146 (Colo. 2005); Jaramillo v.
Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299, 305 (N.M. 1992); Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 615–16 (Wyo. 1999).
215. 823 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1992).
216. Id. at 305.
217. Arthur LaFrance, supra note 54, at 1, 1; see Jaramillo, 823 P.2d at 305; Duggan, supra
note 44, at 198.
218. 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999)
219. Id. at 615–16; see also In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 142 (Colo. 2005)
(“[T]hough [the relocation law] does not prohibit outright a majority time parent from relocating,
it chills the exercise of that parent’s right to travel because, in seeking to relocate, that parent risks
losing majority parent status with respect to the minor child.”).
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Additionally, the court noted that while “a ‘father’s change in visitation
due to mother’s relocation is unfortunate, [it is] not an unusual result of
divorce,’” and that “‘the advantages of the move [should not] be sacrificed . . .
solely to maintain weekly visitation by the father where reasonable alternative
visitation is available . . . .”220 Addressing the issue of intrastate application of
the constitutional right to travel, the court held that it would be “incongruous”
for these constitutional liberties to apply only to situations involving interstate
travel and not to apply equally to travel conducted wholly intrastate.221
As Professor Brigitte Bodenheimer, known for her drafting of the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), argued as early as 1977, punitive
orders that require custodial parents to give up custody of their children in
order to exercise their right to travel are unconstitutional penalties and were
unenforceable under the UCCJA.222 Over thirty years ago she argued that “it is
a safe prophesy that the right-to-move issue in this context is a constitutional
question whose time has come or is overdue.”223 She stressed that:
Impediments on changes of residence held unconstitutional [by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Dunn and Shapiro] are minimal in comparison with the
restraints placed on parents [who seek to relocate with their children].
Imposing the condition of leaving the children behind places the most direct
and oppressive burden on the exercise of constitutional freedom one can
224
imagine.

A court or statute that prohibits a relocating parent’s right to travel, when
other alternatives for frequent and meaningful visitation exist for the nonrelocating parent, does not act in a manner narrowly tailored to meet the state’s
interests.225 There is no compelling state interest that would demand an

220. Watt, 971 P.2d at 614 (citing Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Wyo. 1993)).
221. Id. at 615 (citing King New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth. 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.
1971)).
222. Brigitte Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and
Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody and Excessive Modifications, 65 CAL. L.
REV. 978, 1008–09 (1977).
223. Id. at 1009.
224. Id. (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
642 (1969)).
225. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 77; See id. at 77–78 where LaFrance argues the only
compelling state interest is endangerment, since there are reasonable alternatives available to
protect the father’s interests; see also, In re Sheley, 895 P.2d 850 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995),
overruled on other grounds by In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1997) (finding
that the constitutional right to travel requires that the burden be placed on the noncustodial parent
who is opposing the move); the Sheley court further states:
[T]he nonresidential parent who wishes the court to restrict the residential parent’s right to
relocate with the child has the burden of proving more than simply that the restriction will
serve the best interests of the child. He or she must also prove that the proposed
relocation would be detrimental to the child in some specific way that is not inherent in
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identical degree of visitation to what was in place before relocation, but rather,
the state’s interest is satisfied when the parties, or a court, can produce a viable
alternative.226
Moreover, Missouri law appears to give no consideration to the ability of
the father to move and follow the mother. Accordingly, the law is likely
overinclusive in allowing courts to prevent the relocation of the mother when
the father himself could, but chooses not to, relocate with the mother if he
wanted to stay in close proximity to the child.227
Perhaps such a move would be unrealistic because of the father’s job or
family commitments, but it is often no more unrealistic than the commitments
that the mother is required to give up in order to maintain custody of her
child.228 Preventing a mother’s relocation without considering the father’s
ability to follow essentially forces the mother to give up her constitutional
rights to travel because the father chooses not to exercise his.
2.

Right to Privacy and Right to Raise Children

Courts have long held that there is a “private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter.”229 Beginning in the early 1920s in Meyer v. Nebraska230
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,231 the Supreme Court has recognized a right of
family privacy.232 Almost twenty years later, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the
Supreme Court read Meyer and Pierce as giving parents a fundamental due
process right to determine the upbringing of their children,233 consistent with
the Pierce holding that children “[are] not the mere creature[s] of the state;
the geographical distance between the parents if the move is approved. As Sheley points
out, all change is disruptive, and a simple balancing of the status quo against the
unknowns of the new location, particularly in light of the disruption already attendant to
the separation and divorce, is likely to result in the undue sacrifice of the constitutional
right to travel, often to the detriment of women, many of whom are financially devastated
by divorce and, more often than men, in need of the opportunity to make a new economic
start.
Sheley, 895 P.2d at 850.
226. See, e.g., Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 227 (N.J. 2001) (“[I]t is not any effect on
visitation, but an adverse effect that is pivotal. An adverse effect is not a mere change or even a
lessening of visitation; it is a change in visitation that will not allow the non-custodial parent to
maintain his or her relationship with the child.”) (citation omitted).
227. Other states have required such an inquiry. Rampolla v. Rampolla, 635 A.2d 539, 543–
44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
228. The most frequent type of commitments a mother may have to give up include
employment opportunities, educational opportunities, ability to live near family, and remarriage.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
229. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
230. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
231. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
232. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
233. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
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those who nurture [them] and direct [their] destin[ies] have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [them] for additional
obligations.”234 This right of parents to choose how to raise their children is
grounded in the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
and in an individual’s right to privacy.235
Courts have held that the new family unit(s) created by divorce are entitled
to the same amount of family privacy regarding their decisions as the intact
family would have been given.236
Accordingly, it is presumed that fit parents, married or divorced, act with
the best interests of their children at heart.237 The mere fact that a court would
make a different choice than a fit parent with regard to a child’s upbringing
(whether that decision touches upon where a child should reside, what
activities she should participate in, etc.) does not grant the court authority to
take that decision-making power away from a parent; in other words, “[T]he
Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental
right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge
believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”238
Missouri courts undertake the Orwellian inquiry into whether the move
should be allowed even in cases where the mother seeking to relocate has sole
legal custody, or in other words, sole decision-making power over the child’s
upbringing.239 For example, in Berkbigler, the court gave no credence to the
fact that Ms. Berkbigler had recently been awarded sole decision-making

234. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.
235. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (stating the Fourteenth
Amendment affords constitutional protection to personal decisions, including marriage, family
relationships, child rearing, and education); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Smith v.
Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842–43 (1977) (stating the
Fourteenth Amendment protects personal choice in matters of family life); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (“[F]reedom of personal choice . . . in family life
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
236. Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1993); Day v. LeBlanc, 610 So. 2d 42, 44 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Hill v. Hill, 548 So. 2d 705, 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Osteraas v.
Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948, 951 (Idaho 1993); In re Marriage of Branham, 617 N.E.2d 1317, 1322
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993); In re Marriage of Pribble, 607 N.E.2d 349 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); In re
Marriage of Zamarripa-Gesundheit, 529 N.E.2d 780, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Smith v. Smith,
615 So. 2d 926, 930–31 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Hemphill v. Hemphill, 572 N.Y.S.2d 689, 693
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991); Dobos v. Dobos, 431 S.E.2d 861, 863 (N.C. 1993); Fortin v. Fortin, 500
N.W.2d 229, 231 (S.D. 1993); Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 332 (Tenn. 1993); Lane v.
Schenck, 614 A.2d 786, 790 (Vt. 1992).
237. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (citing Parham v. J.R. 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979)).
238. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–73.
239. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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authority by that very court.240 The father argued that the “[m]other cannot
move wherever she chooses because she had legal custody of the child,” citing
no authority for the statement, except that the relocation statute241 required that
she show that the move was made in good faith and was in the best interest of
the child.242
But legal custody, by its very terms, must imply that a parent or guardian
has the right to make decisions regarding a child’s upbringing, including
decisions about health, education, religion, and welfare, unless a court
concludes that a child’s physical health would be endangered or the child’s
emotional development impaired without the limitation of the legal custodian’s
authority.243 It seems axiomatic that if a parent has been allocated the
authority to make such life-altering decisions, such as whether the child will
undergo a major medical procedure, or be home-schooled rather than attend a
public school, that parent could also retain the right to determine the child’s
residence, so long as that decision does not “significantly and detrimentally”
impinge on the other parent’s visitation time.244
Missouri law allows the mere request to relocate to reopen a settled
custody decision—exploring the best interest factors in excruciating detail—
simply because one parent claims the move may not serve the welfare of the
child. But as put by one Missouri court:
There is no magic in [the] phrase, ‘welfare of the child,’ however. It is no
open sesame to unbridled judicial discretion; it is no talisman by which the
court’s jurisdiction can be stretched beyond its limits . . . . The protection of
the child’s welfare has indeed been the object of the courts in custody cases
from earliest times; but the attainment of that object requires the observance of
principles considerably more practical and less nebulous than a mere
245
declaration of beneficent purpose.

Further, statutes that grant decision-making authority to custodial parents, and
statutes that limit conduct by custodial parents that would “impinge” on a noncustodial parent’s visitation time, are not at odds. Statutes are not to be
construed in a vacuum.246 When two statutes conflict when read together,
courts should seek to harmonize them, giving effect to both to the extent it is
possible.247 When reading § 452.377 (the relocation statute) together with §
240. Brief for Respondent at 15, Buchheit v. Berkbigler, No. 89113 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. Oct.
16, 2007), 2007 WL 3249950.
241. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.377.8.
242. Buchheit, Brief for Respondent, at 15.
243. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 452.375.2, 452.405.1.
244. See Salichs v. James, 268 A.D.2d 168, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
245. Jenks v. Jenks, 385 S.W.2d 370, 377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
246. Baxley v. Jarred, 91 S.W.3d 192, 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (citing State ex rel. Riordan
v. Dierker, 956 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Mo. banc 1997)).
247. Id.
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452.405 (the legal custodian statute), the most logical interpretation of the two
would be to find that a relocation by a legal custodian occurring under §
452.377 may only be prohibited where it is shown that the legal custodian’s
decision about the change of residence would result in certain consequences.
These consequences should require either: (1) endanger the child’s physical
health; (2) impair the child’s emotional development; or (3) “significantly and
detrimentally” interfere with the other parent’s visitation or custody time in a
way that could not be salvaged by reallocating the visitation/custody periods
and allocating transportation costs, pursuant to § 452.377.10. This is the
approach taken by several other states that have recognized that the court
should only have the authority to constrain a move by a custodial parent when
the move will substantially interfere with the non-custodial parent’s
visitation.248 Missouri courts have long held that parents, rather than judges,
should make major child-rearing choices because judges are ill-equipped to
know the unique needs of the child.249 As the Court stated in Jenks:
Courts are not so constituted as to be able to regulate the details of a child’s
upbringing. It exhausts the imagination to speculate on the difficulties to which
they would subject themselves were they to enter the home or the school or the
playground and undertake to exercise on all occasions the authority which one
party or the other would be bound to ascribe to them. . . . Thus, while the court
ought continually to supervise the decisions of the custodian, it ought only
rarely to dictate them. Any other policy will surely oblige the court to assume
every responsibility which it denies to the custodian the discretion to
discharge, and, in its farthest extension, substitute judicial paternalism for
250
custodial responsibility.

248. See, e.g., Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856, 862 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002)
(Pittman, J., concurring) (Limiting review of relocation disputes only in cases where the “planned
relocation is to a place so geographically distant as to render weekly visitation impossible or
impractical”); Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 227 (N.J. 2001). Indeed at least one Missouri
relocation cases has advocated this approach, but it has been overlooked in more recent cases. In
re Marriage of Mayfield, 780 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (“[R]emoval of the child
from the jurisdiction should not be disallowed solely to maintain the existing visitation patterns.”)
(citing In re Marriage of Dusing, 654 S.W.2d 938, 942–43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Auge v. Auge,
334 N.W.2d 393, 397–99 (Minn. 1983); D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio, 365 A.2d 27, 29 (N.J. Ch.
1976).
249. See, e.g., Jenks, 385 S.W.2d at 377–78.
250. Id. at 377. Although Jenks is an older case, it is still very much good law. No Missouri
case has overruled its proposition on this issue, and Jenks has been cited frequently by courts both
within and without of Missouri for its proposition on this issue. See e.g., Leahy v. Leahy, 858
S.W.2d 221, 226 (Mo. 1993). Further, one of the leading family law casebooks continues to use a
discussion of Jenks’ reasoning as an illustration of the court’s proper role in acting as a “tie–
breaker” for parents who cannot agree. See WALTER WADLINGTON & RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: CASES AND PROBLEMS 1155 (6th ed. 2008).
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Yet, more fundamentally at issue, is that the new family unit created by a
couple’s divorce or separation should be entitled to the same amount of
parental and individual autonomy and freedom from government intrusion into
its child rearing decisions as are allotted to an intact family.251 When a trial
court attempts to dictate to a fit custodial parent where the parent can create his
or her residence, the court is not only “substituting judicial paternalism” for a
parent’s reasoned judgment, it is infringing on that parent’s constitutional
rights.252 As the Supreme Court held in Troxel, a trial court’s disagreement
with a mother concerning what is in the child’s best interest is insufficient to
override that parent’s rights to choose how to raise her child.253 As the Court
explained, “the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the
fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a
state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.”254
Currently, a father alone may choose to bar the exercise of the mother’s
right, or he may do nothing and permit her relocation; the choice is his, and his
alone when he is the objecting party.255 A father takes on the role of
gatekeeper, deciding whether State intervention into the mother’s decisionmaking will take place, while a custodial mother can only wait and hope that
her former spouse or lover chooses not to invoke the heavy-handed power of
state intervention. Such a policy renders the State, at least in relocation
disputes, as little more than an agent of the father, as the choice is solely his as
to whether State involvement will be invoked.256
As a New Jersey court put it, relocation restrictions which trap a woman in
a geographic location near her child’s father are “consigning [her] for the next
decade and a half to the immediate orbit of a man to whom she was briefly and
unhappily married, to what [may be] for her an alien environment in which she
has neither family nor professional ties, and to what would mean for her the
sacrifice of her own professional, social and personal interests.”257
The overwhelming amount of discretion granted to fathers might be
compared to the spousal-consent deemed unconstitutional by the Casey court.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,258 the Supreme

251. See, e.g., Stephen v. Stephen, 937 P.2d 92, 99–100 (Okla. 1997).
252. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding
that even where there is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of another race may be
subjected to pressure and stress, it is insufficient to infringe upon a parent’s fundamental liberty
interest); see also Stephen, 937 P.2d at 97 (“The trial court’s personal beliefs should not be forced
on a custodial parent who has made a legitimate decision for the benefit of the minor children.”).
253. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63.
254. Id. at 72–73.
255. See LaFrance, supra note 54, at 92.
256. Id. at 93.
257. Helentjaris v. Sudano, 476 A.2d 828, 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
258. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Court held that a burden on freedom of choice is “undue”—and therefore
unconstitutional—when it deters women from exercising constitutionally
protected choices.259 In Casey, one of the burdens was notifying a husband
before getting an abortion;260 in the present case it is the burden of a mother
potentially losing custody of her child to a former husband (or lover) as a
consequence of her relocation. In either instance, the burden may deter
exercise of a fundamental right and deny due process. The Casey Court held
that marriage is an association of individuals and “[t]he Constitution protects
individuals, men and women alike, from unjustified state interference, even
when that interference is enacted into law for the benefit of their spouses.”261
Further:
[A] husband’s interest in the life of the child his wife is carrying does not
permit the State to empower him with this troubling degree of authority over
his wife. The contrary view leads to consequences reminiscent of the common
law. A husband has no enforceable right to require a wife to advise him before
she exercises her personal choices. . . . A state may not give to a man the kind
262
of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their children.

Although Casey’s holding applies to a mother’s choice in bearing a child, a
mother’s choice to relocate herself and her children to another geographical
area continues to fall under Casey’s recognition of the privacy and primacy of
a woman’s right to make choices about how to rear her children. To hold that
a mother’s liberty interest and decision-making concerning whether to bear her
child (if at all) should be more highly valued than her right to decide where she
can rear the very child she has borne would amount to an obvious absurdity,
for it would be to effectively hold that a mother’s right to make decisions for
herself and her child diminishes at precisely the time she needs more (rather
than less) discretion over how to rear her children.
As in the underlying facts of Casey, Missouri’s relocation statute gives a
father veto power over many of a mother’s most basic, fundamental rights and
personal decisions. A father’s ability to prevent a mother’s relocation could
possibly impinge on a mother’s right and ability to marry, should such a
marriage involve a relocation on her part, and may even limit her ability to
create a new, intact family for herself and her child. If a father chooses not to
object to a proposed relocation on the part of a mother, she is freely allowed to
travel and relocate. If a father chooses to prevent the relocation, he has all too
often quashed any opportunity the mother had for a new life she felt was in the
best interest of herself and her children. Such authority not only results in the
father oftentimes having ultimate control over whether a relocation is likely to
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 895.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 896.
Id. at 898.
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take place, but also grants him dominion over the exercise of a mother’s most
basic and fundamental rights.263
“The state registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates
children from the custody of fit parents.”264 In Moore v. City of East
Cleveland,265 the Court held that when a city attempted to restrict the right of a
family to live together, “this Court must examine carefully the importance of
the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by
the challenged restriction.”266 If Missouri’s objective was to promote and
preserve the best interests of the children of divorce who are facing relocation,
then Missouri’s relocation laws seemingly do little to protect these interests.
Missouri’s relocation law, however, does result in enormous fallout and
damage to the families held captive to a geographical area by the whims of a
mother’s former husband or lover. The statute is also grossly underinclusive in
meeting its purported interest, because the statute does not require parents to
live in geographic proximity to each other. Even when parents live great
distances away from one another, courts have fashioned custody-sharing
arrangements. For example, the court has no authority to consider the
relocation statute in an initial custody determination.267 Similarly, the noncustodial parent can choose to move to a distant location at any time, no matter
how difficult it will be for the children or for the other parent.268
These interests are protected and promoted by the state to the exclusion of
a mother’s new family, home or career, and all too often to the detriment of her
family, husband, or children. Upon attempting to relocate, a custodial mother
can have every aspect of her decision-making questioned and probed by a
court, her parenting examined, and the most intimate details of her life
unearthed for review, and all at her former lover’s behest. If there still exists a
“private realm of family life which the state [should not] enter,” the decision

263. Id. at 851 (“Our laws afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education . . . These
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
264. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
265. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
266. Id. at 499.
267. Day ex. rel Finnern v. Day, 256 S.W.3d 600, 603, (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
268. “[A] noncustodial parent can relocate at will—without leave from or even providing
notice to any court—no matter what impact relocation may have on the children or the ability of
the custodial parent to fulfill parenting functions . . . No matter how [a father’s potential]
relocation might affect [his children] emotionally, socially, or otherwise, no one suggests that [the
mother] is entitled to seek a decree ordering her former husband to remain in Arkansas to
continue his relationship with . . . the children . . . .” Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d
856, 873 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002).
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concerning where to rear one’s children should most certainly be included
within that realm.
3.

Right to Marry

Remarriage is one of the most commonly asserted reasons for relocation.
It is also common for a mother to request to relocate based on a new spouse’s
employment transfer. Missouri’s relocation law may prohibit parents from
relocating to live with a new spouse—a prohibition that interferes with the
parent and the new spouse’s constitutional right to marry.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic
civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”269 The
right to marry predates the Constitution and exists as a part of the liberty
guaranteed by the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.270 Because the
right to marry is fundamental, a state may only interfere with the right when it
asserts a compelling state interest and assures that that interest is narrowly
tailored.
In Zablocki v. Redhail,271 the Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin
statute preventing any resident required to support minor children from getting
married without showing that the support obligation was being paid and that
the children were not likely to become public charges. In so holding, the Court
found the state did not show a “compelling state interest” or a means “narrowly
tailored” because the statute in no way ensured that support money was being
paid to children, and the state had other and more effective ways to ensure that
children received financial support from their parents.272
Zablocki’s reasoning applies to custody cases where a court forces a parent
to forfeit custody of her child if she chooses to live with a new spouse.273
Certainly if a state does not have a compelling state interest to restrict marriage
to compel financial support for minor children, it is hard to imagine a state
having a compelling interest to restrict marriage because the minor child needs
regular contact with both parents; yet, that contact can be provided for by
alternative visitation schedules and a reallocation of transportation costs.
Although Missouri’s relocation law, unlike the law in Zablocki, does not
directly prohibit a parent from obtaining a legal marriage, it can and does
269. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942)).
270. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–86 (1978); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 491 (1965); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248 (1983); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
271. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
272. Id. at 395–96.
273. Several family law scholars have opined that relocation restrictions that hinder a
woman’s right to marry and relocate to live with her new husband violate the mandate set forth in
Zablocki v. Redhail. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 34, at 293–94 n.57.
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prevent mothers from relocating to live with their new spouses. Under
Missouri law, the right to cohabit with a spouse is inherent in the fundamental
right to marry.274 At a minimum, prohibiting a mother from relocating to live
with her soon-to-be spouse unconstitutionally “chills the exercise” of the right
to marry. This is seen in many cases where mothers have delayed wedding
plans pending the outcome of their relocation cases.275 In these situations, it is
hard in many cases to even see a rational basis for denying a mother the right
to relocate her residence to live with her new husband―which threatens to
destroy an intact marriage and family for the sake of “preserving” a
dysfunctional one.276
A mother’s remarriage not only benefits the mother, but generally
improves a child’s economic and emotional well-being. Women who remarry
increase the family income threefold and decrease the likelihood that their
children will live in poverty.277 Stepfathers may also alleviate some of the
child-rearing burdens placed on mothers: they may be available to share in
supervising and transporting the children, help with homework, and
communicate with the children. In fact, recent research has shown that
psychologically, children can benefit as much from a good relationship with a
stepfather as they can with their biological father.278
Select courts have recognized the moral bankruptcy in requiring a parent to
literally choose between her new spouse and her child. For example, the
Nebraska Supreme Court reversed a trial court’s and appellate court’s ruling
that refused to allow the custodial mother to move to Arizona with her son, to
join her new husband there.279 There, the trial court found that the mother was
better suited to be residential parent, but still disallowed her move.280 The
court held Nebraska would not force a custodial parent to make such a choice
between her son and her spouse.281 Similarly, in criticizing an Arkansas trial
court’s holding that denied a mother the right to relocate to live with her new
spouse, an Arkansas appellate judge noted:
274.
275.
276.
277.

Komosa v. Komosa, 939 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
See notes 211–20 and accompanying text (discussing a case with similar circumstances).
See Bruch, supra note 34, at 293–94 n.57.
See MARY ANN MASON, THE MODERN AMERICAN STEPFAMILY: PROBLEMS AND
POSSIBILITIES, in ALL OUR FAMILY: NEW POLICIES FOR A NEW CENTURY 100–01 (Mary Ann
Mason, et al. eds., 2003); Christine Bachrach, Children in Families: Characteristics of
Biological, Step-, and Adopted Children, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 171, 176 (1983) (stating that
almost 49% of children living with a single mother are living below the poverty line, in contrast
to 8% of children who live with a mother and step-father).
278. Lynn White & Joan G. Gilbreth, When Children Have Two Fathers: Effects of
Relationships with Stepfathers and Noncustodial Fathers on Adolescent Outcomes, 63 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 155, 160 (2001).
279. Harder v. Harder, 524 N.W.2d 325, 329–30 (Neb. 1994).
280. Id.
281. Id.
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One would ordinarily think that courts encourage marriage. After all, judges
and other officiants at marriage ceremonies profess that marriage is an
honorable estate. I know of no caveat that holds remarriage to be less
honorable or less worthy of affirmation. . . . So it is more than a little strange
that the law would essentially penalize a custodial parent who takes the
honorable step of marriage following divorce if remarriage carries the prospect
282
of life outside [the state].

D. Pervasive Bias
There is ample reason to believe that much of the reluctance to allow
mothers to relocate with their children comes from an inherent bias in the
judiciary.283 The best interest standard, standing alone, has been criticized as
being unduly vague.284 As a consequence, judges often rely on their own life
experiences and biases in making rulings.285 Precisely because the standards
are vague, it is easy for judges to hide potentially irrelevant, sexist, or
geographical biases and substitute their own values for those of the
legislature.286 In multiple studies, judges have admitted to not complying with
state statutes or precedent when making custody decisions.287 Often the trial
court will fail to even “make findings of fact, to write an opinion, or to
reconcile the case with precedent.”288 When judges are given virtually
unbridled discretion to decide child custody disputes, and in turn use that

282. Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856, 862 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002) (Griffen J.,
concurring).
283. See infra notes 324–94 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 185–210 and accompanying text (criticizing the best interests test as
vague, biased, and unworkable in practice).
285. See, e.g., Robert E. Emery et al., A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations:
Limited Science and a Flawed System, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1 (2005); Jeff Atkinson,
Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 16 (1984)
(Custody decisions are often determined by what is “in the heart of the trial judge(s)”); Susan
Beth Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind the “Best Interest of the Child” Standard in
Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845, 849 (1997); Charlow, supra note 107, at 271;
Duggan, supra note 44, at 195, (stating that judges “kid [themselves] if [they] think [they] are
applying some value-neutral best interest standard instead of one based on [their] own prejudices
and biases”); Sheehan, supra note 177, at 138; Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication:
Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 257–62
(1975); Judith A. Fournie, Note, Post-Divorce Visitation: A Study in the Deprivation of Rights, 27
DEPAUL L. REV. 113, 113 (1977); Pfenning, supra note 180, at 118–19, 124.
286. Id. at 272–73; Pastis, supra note 45, at 420.
287. Charlow, supra note 107, at 272; see also Pfenning, supra note 181, at 119 (reviewing
decisions from multiple jurisdictions and arguing that judges do not always follow legal mandates
when deciding child custody actions).
288. Pastis, supra note 45, at 425 (citing Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication:
Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 253–54
(1975)).
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discretion to subvert the legislature’s intent, statutes that were created to
protect children might end up harming them.289
1.

Gender Bias

Relocation jurisprudence has been hailed as a critical women’s legal
issue.290 In many cases, the decisions often appear to be based on outmoded
stereotypes of what a “good mother” is supposed to look like.291 Both
anecdotal reports and reports from task forces in various states show that
gender bias is a problem in both relocation cases and other child custody
decisions.292 Some have called it a “nationwide backlash of [gender]
discrimination” disguised by the best interest standard.293
For an example of this bias, consider one court that “applaud[ed the
mother’s] efforts to be upwardly mobile economically, and [found] her efforts
at job improvement count[ed] to her advantage as a role model,” but
nevertheless denied her petition to relocate.294 Such career-seeking moves
were often seen to be in conflict with the child’s overall well-being.295 Nor are
moves by a mother in order to attend college, obtain a graduate degree, or enter
a specialized education program often viewed favorably by judges.296
Missouri judges fared no better in anecdotal reports published by the Missouri
Task Force on Gender and Justice. As the director of the Missouri Coalition
Against Domestic Violence testified, “There are often inappropriate comments
and belittling behaviors that occur within the courtroom from the bench.”297
Custody decisions show that “mothers are losing custody as a result of . . .
inappropriate criteria caused by gender bias unrelated to the best interest of the
child.”298

289. See Pfenning, supra note 180, at 119.
290. Ford, supra note 69, at 1; see generally Pastis, supra note 45 (arguing that restricting the
mobility of custodial parents is a form of sex-based discrimination).
291. Jacobs, supra note 285, at 868 (1997).
292. Sheehan, supra note 177, at 135 (stating that child custody laws reinforce stereotypical
gender roles in families).
293. Jacobs, supra note 285, at 848–49 (quoting Laurie Woods et al., Sex and Economic
Discrimination in Child Custody Awards, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1130 (1983)).
294. Glennon, supra note 38, at 129 (quoting Fields v. Fields, 749 N.E.2d 100, 109 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001)).
295. Id. at 129–30.
296. Glennon, supra note 38, at 135–36.
297. Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 505.
298. Jacobs, Nancy D. Polikoff, Why are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used
in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 235, 236 (1982); Richmond v.
Tecklenberg, 396 S.E.2d 111 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990); Anderson v. Anderson, 472 N.W.2d 519
(S.D. 1991).
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Even when relocation standards are applied evenhandedly, they often have
a disparate effect upon women.299 One reason for criticism is that focusing on
objective criteria tends to obscure the less quantifiable psychological aspects of
relocation—judges overemphasize quantifiable factors such as an increase in
income and ignore the more personal factors such as a need to start over or to
get remarried.300 And if the economic positions of the parties are compared,
“women are likely to be disadvantaged.”301
Restraining women in their movement invokes criticism because it allows
for men’s domination of women even after a marriage has ended, particularly
in relocation cases where implicit notions of appropriate gender roles often
influence judicial decisions.302 Overall, “residence restrictions are sex-based in
their application, justification, and effect because they exist to protect only the
interests of the noncustodial father.”303
2.

Status Quo Bias

Studies indicate that, generally, judges do not like deciding family law
cases.304 Judges may dislike having to upset the status quo and often become
impatient when family law attorneys appear frequently before the court to
secure their clients’ rights.305 As a result, judges are inclined to find that
preserving the status quo is the best way to preserve the best interests of the
child.306 The difficulty inherent in deciding whether children should be
relocated encourages judges to avoid the consequences of a potential
decisional error by preserving the custody arrangement the way it is and by
forcing the mother to make the difficult choice of whether she should stay or
go.307 This type of decision avoidance has been called “choice deferral.”308
299. Sheehan, supra note 176, at 138 (arguing that they cause disparate economic effects);
Pastis, supra note 45, at 420 (arguing that they give father veto power over the mother).
300. Sheehan, supra note 176, at 138.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 135, 136 (citing Fran Olsen, The Politics of Family Law, 2 LAW & INEQ. 1 (1984)).
303. Pastis, supra note 45, at 421 (“If most custodial parents were men, residence restrictions
would cease to exist or would be analyzed differently; the focus would finally be on the real
interests at stake for all involved.”).
304. One judge complained that “[he] would rather send someone to life in the penitentiary”
than decide a child custody case. Charlow, supra note 107, at 272 (citing Jessica Pearson &
Maria A. Luchesi-Ring, Judicial Decision-Making in Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703
(1982–83)); see also Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 537–39 (reporting that
Missouri judges have negative attitudes toward family law, believe it to be lower-status work, and
often dislike deciding private family matters).
305. See Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 539.
306. See Marie Eyre et al., Decision Inertia: The Impact of Organizations on Critical Incident
Decision-Making, in POLICING CRITICAL INCIDENTS: LEADERSHIP AND CRITICAL INCIDENT
MANAGEMENT 207 (Laurence Alison & Jonathan Crego, eds., 2008).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 208.
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Psychologically, people are inclined “to weigh potential losses more than
potential gains in the same amount.”309 To explain, when faced with the
choice between potential harm to the child associated with moving to a distant
location and the potential improvements that a move may bring to a child’s
life, judges may seek to minimize the harm to the child, rather than maximize
the gain. Judges avoid the guilt they could potentially incur as a result of their
actions by merely declining to act.310 This overly simplistic thinking, however,
fails to account for the harm both the mother and the child may face by
suffering through prolonged litigation and sacrificing important goals.
3.

Nuclear Family Bias

Family law has often intruded into people’s most important life choices.
Divorced and never-married parents have to justify decisions in a way that
would never be required of intact families. For example, it is likely that no one
would question an intact family’s decision to relocate for a job opportunity
even if there was clear evidence that the relocation would have detrimental
effects on the child. The reasons for the nuclear family bias are unclear. Is it
that only children of divorce or out-of-wedlock relationships are worth
protecting? Is it that only married parents are capable of making good choices
for how to raise their children?
Judge Duggan has criticized the adversarial custody system as taking
power away from parents.311 As he explains, “They’re their kids—the parents
should decide what’s best . . . our goal should be to empower parents and assist
them in reaching decisions that are in their children’s best interest. Instead, at
every step, we disempower them.”312
In In re the Marriage of Burgess, the court came closer to this ideal when
it refused to allow trial courts to “‘micromanage’. . . everyday decisions about
career and family.”313 We presume that parents in intact families “[make] the
decision to move with the best interests of their children in mind.”314 There is
no reason why the same should not hold true when a mother in a post-divorce
family decides to move since the awarding of custody to the mother has
created a new family unit, and an initial court proceeding found the mother to
be the best custodian to protect the child’s interests.315 As some have
observed, “There is no greater need for the court to substitute its judgment of
309. Id.
310. See id.
311. Duggan, supra note 44, at 193.
312. Id. at 196.
313. In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 481 (Cal. 1996).
314. Bowermaster, supra note 96, at 445; Pastis, supra note 45, at 431; Richard F. Storrow,
The Policy of Family Privacy: Uncovering the Bias in Favor of Nuclear Families in American
Constitutional Law and Policy Reform, 66 MO. L. REV. 527, 618 (2001).
315. Pastis, supra note 45, at 431.
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what will serve the best interests of the child in the post-divorce family unit
than in the traditional family setting.”316 Allowing judicial inquiry into the
decisions of the custodial parent only serves to destabilize a new family unit
and encourage hostility between the two parents.317
Some courts have created a more reasoned response to a parent’s request to
relocate: they have recognized that divorce alters the relationship between
children and their parents and that it is unrealistic to pretend that a broken
family will continue to live as if the family is still intact.318 As the Connecticut
Supreme Court wrote, “It may not be realistic to try to preserve completely the
quality and nature of the relationship that the noncustodial parent enjoyed with
the child, especially if such preservation is maintained at the cost of the
custodial parent’s ability to start a new, potentially improved life for herself or
himself and the child.”319
4.

Economic Bias

The price tag of litigating relocation disputes, coupled with the uncertainty
of succeeding, is likely a significant enough deterrent to prevent women from
attempting to move if they suspect the non-custodial parent would object.320
Consider the case of the domestic violence victim, Deb,321 who was a
successful businesswoman.322 In the course of the litigation, she was forced to
quit work, enroll in welfare, and pay over $15,000 for psychological
evaluations—not including the costs of her son’s weekly therapy sessions.323
By the time her case was over, “she owe[d] her family law attorney $50,000,
owe[d] her parents $50,000, and file[d] for bankruptcy.”324 Because men are
generally in a better financial situation than women after divorce,325 men can
sometimes use the cost of litigation as a weapon to oppress women’s legal
rights. This is sometimes termed “winning by financial attrition.”326

316. Id.
317. Ford, supra note 69, at 19 (citing Barbara E. Handschu, Revolution in Relocation Law,
N.Y. L.J., May 17, 1996, at 1).
318. See, e.g., Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 681 (Conn. 1998); D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio,
365 A.2d 27, 29-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976).
319. Ireland, 717 A.2d at 681.
320. See Sheehan, supra note 176, at 139, 144.
321. See supra notes 136–53 and accompanying text.
322. Bowermaster, supra note 96, at 435.
323. Id. at 434–35.
324. Id. at 435.
325. “[T]he average divorced man can earn as much as the couple’s entire net worth in only
ten months after the divorce.” Kathryn E. Abare, Note, Protecting the New Family: Ireland v.
Ireland and Connecticut’s Custodial Parent Relocation Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 307, 324 (1999)
(citing SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 163 (1989)).
326. Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 535.
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The cost of divorce often leaves women in dire economic straits.327
Women are disadvantaged financially for a number of reasons, but often it is
because they have taken time out of the labor force to raise children and
perform household labor.328 The first year after divorce, a woman with
children is likely to see a 73% decrease in her standard of living.329
Immediately after divorce, poor mothers are often forced by economics to
move frequently—on average seven times within the first six years of
divorce.330
Justice Wendell Griffen, writing for the Arkansas appellate court in
Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, recognized the increased difficulties women face
post-divorce and explained that the difficulties are directly related to women’s
reasons for relocation:
Our society has long practiced a double standard regarding social freedom and
gender. . . . [M]en are unentitled beneficiaries of greater social, economic, and
cultural freedom than women who, for reasons largely due to gender, labor
under greater social, economic, and cultural burdens when they try to exercise
freedoms men often take for granted. Men are less likely to encounter social
ostracism than women after divorce, no matter the reason for divorce. They are
less prone to encounter discrimination on account of their gender in the
workplace, whether they are custodial parents or not. . . . [T]hroughout
American society, men earn decisively more money than women, even when
performing the same work. Thus, the social, economic, and cultural forces that
might influence a divorced woman to relocate to another state usually will not
affect men the same way. . . .
I cannot ignore the gender-specific
331
consequences it portends.

Restricting women from opportunities that will provide them better jobs,
further their education, or allow them to remarry increases the likelihood that
women will end up in poverty.332 Such relocation policies that restrict the
opportunities of women are unwise. Author Ann Crittenden tells of a

327. ALLISON CLARKE-STEWART & CORNELIA BRENTANO, DIVORCE: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 97 (2006).
328. Id. at 200. Taking time out of the labor force can prevent them from getting raises,
decrease their retirement savings, and make them less employable when they decide to reenter the
workforce. Id. at 200–02. Even when women remain in the workforce, they often are required to
work part time or take flexible employment, or take more time off of work to meet their childrearing obligations. Id. at 112, 200.
329. See JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN,
WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 19 (1989) (citing LENORE J. WEITZMAN,
THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 323 (1985)).
330. HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 88, at 88.
331. Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856, 874 (Ark. 2002).
332. See CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 328, at 97 (discussing a study of sixty
middle-class women after divorce, finding that most women struggled to survive economically
and two years after the divorce, 85% did not recover economically.
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conversation she had with Lawrence Summers, a distinguished economist,
former president of Harvard, and newly appointed head of the White House
Economic Council, where he explained that “[r]aising children is the most
important job in the world.”333 This is so because in today’s economy, twothirds of the world’s wealth is created by “human capital”: the skills, creativity,
and enterprise of humans.334 As economist Shirley Burggraf explained, this
means that parents rearing their children are “the major wealth producers in
our economy.”335 But to properly support and raise children, mothers require a
stable and secure income.
Judicial policies that inhibit women’s plights to seek better lives for
themselves and their children through higher education, a better job
opportunity, or remarriage virtually ensure that women have little opportunity
to escape a perilous, semi-dependent economic status. Rather, states should
encourage mothers to seek post-secondary education and certainly not penalize
them if they seek to relocate to obtain a college degree or further education or
employment opportunities. The benefits for both the mother and the children
are profound. Women’s salaries dramatically increase with college degrees,
degrees reduce mothers’ likelihood of being poor by about fifteen percent, and
degrees help insulate women from economic downturns.336 College education
also increases mothers’ expectations of their children’s achievement,
encourage children’s own educational aspirations, and correlate with early
development of literacy skills in children—which increases the likelihood the
children will be successful in school.337
E.

Contingent Custody Transfers

Usually when judges deny a relocation request, they order what is called a
“contingent custody transfer,” which is a conditional order where the noncustodial parent (usually father) is awarded physical custody of the children if,
and only if, the custodial parent (usually mother) chooses to relocate.338 This
type of order is effectively “judicial blackmail”—the purpose is to strong-arm
the custodial parent, likely the mother, into abandoning the move and

333. ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN
2 (2001).
334. Id.
335. Id. (quoting SHIRLEY P. BURGGRAF, THE FEMININE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC MAN 64
(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
336. Peggy Kahn et al., Introduction, in SHUT OUT: LOW INCOME MOTHERS AND HIGHER
EDUCATION IN POST-WELFARE AMERICA 1, 9 (Valerie Polakow et al. eds., 2004).
337. Id.
338. Bruch, supra note 34, at 284; Caroline Ritchie Heil, Comment, Relocation Cases as
Change in Custody Proceedings: “Judicial Blackmail,” or Competing Interests Reconciled?, 51
S.C. L. REV. 885, 896 (2000).
THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED
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maintaining the status quo.339 Most of the time judges make these orders
expecting the custodial parent to abandon the move, and as a result, judges
enter the order without considering whether it would be more harmful for the
child to change custody than it would be for the child to relocate with the
custodial parent.340
At times the custodial parent, likely the mother, may have no choice but to
move. In those circumstances, the conditional custody transfer makes no
sense―the child will still have to move, but the move will be into the home of
the non-custodial parent rather than relocating with the custodial parent.341
Not only is the child faced with the detrimental effects of a move, but the child
also faces the loss of his or her primary caretaker.342
If the parent “chooses” not to relocate, however, he or she may retain the
status quo and keep custody of the child. For most parents, usually mothers,
that “choice” is not really a choice at all. 343 Commentators have called
decisions such as these a “Sophie’s Choice,” referring to the the William
Styron novel of that name that chronicles the lead character’s forced decision
in a Nazi concentration camp to choose which one of her two children would
live and which would die.344 Judges may fail to consider the collateral damage
such “choices” may cause. Mothers who give up significant life opportunities
often become depressed and resentful for their “grievous loss.”345 Children
can often sense their mother’s anguish resulting from the lost opportunity and
may become emotionally disturbed as a result.346 Tensions between the
warring parents often get worse, not better, following the end of the relocation
trial.347 As a result, children may receive diminished parenting.348 Yet, as Ann
339. Bruch, supra note 34, at 284–85.
340. Id.; see also In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81, 102 (Cal. 2004) (Kennard, J.,
dissenting); In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 481, n.7 (Cal. 1996).
341. Bruch, supra note 34, at 284.
342. Id.
343. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 39.
344. Id. at 9 n.49; see also Lane v. Schenck, 614 A.2d 786, 792 (Vt. 1992) (using the term
“Sophie’s choice” to describe the mother’s dilemma).
345. Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at 315.
346. Consider the letter sent to Judith Wallerstein and attached as Appendix A to her Amicus
Brief. Brief for Tony J. Tanke as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 88, at
Appendix A, 1. There, a mother who was initially forced to give up her dream to go to medical
school reported that her seven-year-old daughter “repeatedly asked [her] if [she] was going to
leave [the daughter] to go to medical school” and as a result began having nightmares and chronic
stomachaches. Id. The child’s pediatrician explained to the mother that the child’s medical
issues derived from her anguish that the mother might choose to go to medical school without
taking her. Id.
347. Valdespino, supra note 99, at 22.
348. Id.; see also Bruch, supra note 34, at 287 (citing Judith S. Wallerstein & Julia M. Lewis,
The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: Report of a 25-Year Study, 21 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL.
353, 359 (2004)) (“[S]tressed-out parents provide . . . ‘seriously diminished parenting.’”).
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Crittenden argues, “It isn’t fair to expect mothers to make sacrifices that no
one else is asked to make, or have virtues that no one else possesses, such as a
dignified subordination of their personal agenda and a reliance on altruism for
life’s meaning.”349 In fact, “Virtues and sacrifices, when expected of one
group of people and not of everyone, become the mark of an underclass.”350
Other states, such as the Vermont Supreme Court, have disallowed the use
of conditional custody transfers to regulate the choices of custodial parents.351
Missouri should follow the lead of other states by finding that conditional
orders may not be used to “blackmail” a mother into abandoning her relocation
plans.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
One author has argued that “[g]iven the existing patchwork of state laws
and the peripatetic nature of contemporary society, any effort to impose strict
limits on the movement of parties post-divorce seems naïve at best,
unconstitutional at worst, and doomed to almost certain failure in any
event.”352 Missouri’s archaic relocation laws, based on unrealistic notions
about post-divorce life, are in need of serious revision.
Family law scholars have long argued that child custody decisions,
including relocation decisions, should be governed by a set of objective
standards that would minimize potential bias, while still allowing judges a
certain level of discretion.353 Scholars have proposed a wide variety of
solutions to the problem, but no plan has received widespread support from
courts or legislatures.354 Because relocation decisions are necessarily factspecific, some scholars question the likelihood that “any specific test or
standard can do justice” in complex relocation decisions.
This proposal attempts to shelter a mother’s interests in seeking a new life
in a new location, while protecting a father’s right to have realistic visitation
with his child and still allow the courts to bar relocation when it would
endanger a child. The proposal recognizes the importance of maintaining a
positive father-child relationship but also recognizes that this can usually be
accomplished through creative visitation schedules and proactive
communication, rather than through an outright prohibition on a mother’s right
to relocate. This proposal attempts to be both objective and discretionary and

349. CRITTENDEN, supra note 333, at 9.
350. Id.
351. See, e.g., Lane v. Schenck, 614 A.2d 786, 790 (Vt. 1992).
352. Barry Scholl, Note, A Matter the Court Should Consider?: The Risk of Relocation and
the Custody Conundrum, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 353, 358–59 (2004).
353. See Pfenning, supra note 180, at 129.
354. See, e.g., id. at 128–29 (suggesting custody decisions should be decided by a three-judge
panel instead of by one trial judge to minimize bias).
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takes into account many important factors discussed in court opinions, legal
scholarship, and psychological research.
A.

Missouri Should Modify the Burden of Proof and the Statutory Scheme for
Considering Relocations

In Missouri, the relocating parent has the burden of proving that the move
is in the best interest of the child.355 Missouri should transpose its burden of
proof, allowing a primary custodial parent to move (without judicial
intervention) unless the non-relocating parent files a motion to prevent
relocation and proves that the move is not in the best interests of the child.
If the non-custodial parent files a motion to prevent relocation, the court
should decide the case based on a four-step burden-shifting standard. First, the
judge should require the relocating parent to prove that the relocation request is
made in good faith. If the judge finds that the relocation request is not made in
good faith, and is instead an attempt to alienate the non-custodial parent or
frustrate visitation, then the court should presumptively deny the relocation
request, ending the analysis. 356 If the court, however, finds that the parent’s
request was made in good faith, it would proceed to step two—determining the
best interest of the child.
In step two, the non-relocating parent has the burden of proving that the
move is not in the best interest of the child. Rather than allowing the judge
unfettered discretion in applying an amorphous “best interests” test, the judge
would be required to complete a judicial form that lists the relevant factors to
be weighed in a relocation dispute.357 The form would have a series of
statements regarding the relocation request, and the judge could answer by
indicating whether, in the context of that specific case, he strongly agreed;
agreed; felt neutral; disagreed; or strongly disagreed with the statement. He
would also have the option of discarding questions that were not applicable to
the current situation. On certain factors, the judge could also indicate the level
of importance the factor had in the present dispute; thus judges would be less
likely to overemphasize any one factor. When the form was completed, the
judge’s responses would be calculated, and the score of the calculation would
indicate whether the move would fall in one of three potential categories:
“would likely be in the child’s best interest,” “may or may not be in the child’s
best interest,” or “likely would not be in the child’s best interest.”
If the resulting calculation indicates that the move “would likely be in the
best interests of the child,” it creates a rebuttable presumption that the move
should be allowed unless the judge rebuts the form by showing that either (1)
the presumption was unjust or improper because it did not adequately reflect
355. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.377.9 (2002).
356. See, e.g., Valdespino, supra note 99, at 22.
357. See Appendix A, for a suggestion of forms for a court to use in relocation cases.
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the best interests of the child, or (2) that the move would endanger the child’s
health or welfare.
If the calculation indicates that the move “may or may not be in the best
interests of the child,” it would also create a rebuttable presumption that the
move should be allowed, unless the judge rebuts the form. This is because the
custodial parent has already been chosen as the primary caretaker, and the law
should aim to protect the child’s relationship with its primary caretaker and
preserve the stability of the original custody determination.
If the calculation indicates that the move would likely not be in the child’s
best interest, the court would be required to make an additional ruling under
step three of the analysis. In step three, the judge would be required to
consider which alternative would be the least detrimental to the child. If the
move, although problematic, would be a better alternative because it would
allow the child to remain in the custody of the primary custodial parent, then
the move should be allowed. In contrast, if a child would be better served by
living with the non-custodial parent than relocating with the custodial parent,
the move should be denied. In effect, the court is deciding whether the child
would be better served by moving with the custodial parent or staying with the
non-custodial parent.358
Additionally, if a judge is unsatisfied that the form has reached the correct
result, he may rebut the form in step four, after completing the form and the
subsequent analysis.359 If the judge rebuts the form, he should make findings
of fact and conclusions of law explaining why a deviation from the form would
be in the child’s best interests. This analysis helps preserve the reasoning
behind the judge’s decision to allow or deny the move and focuses the judge
on the factors that should be most important in relocation disputes.
If the relocation is allowed, the court should fashion a visitation schedule
that will allow the non-custodial parent a realistic opportunity for contact with
the child. The court should also consider implementing the use of technology
to foster the child’s relationship with the non-custodial parent.360 As the
Missouri Court of Appeals has held in the past, “in this age of high speed
travel and common use of communication technology,” parties can discuss the
child’s needs and resolve those needs as effectively as they could if the parents
lived in the same city.361

358. See Charles Bauer, Relocation of Children After Divorce, ADVOCATE, Jun. 2001, at 12,
13 (citing Lane v. Schenck, 614 A.2d 786, 495–96 (Vt. 1992)).
359. Such rebuttable presumptions create continuity in decision-making while recognizing
that any situation will likely have “outliers” that do not quite fit in a general scheme. Allowing
the court to rebut the presumption when atypical circumstances arise allows for some flexibility
in unique circumstances. See Bruch, supra note 34, at 294.
360. See, e.g., Gottfried, supra note 37, at 475.
361. McCubbin v. Taylor, 5 S.W.3d 202, 208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
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This reversal of the burden of proof in relocation cases incorporates three
major legal doctrines at play in child-custody disputes—doctrines that seek to
preserve the continuity and stability of a child’s relationship with his or her
custodial parent: (1) that it is generally in the child’s best interests to preserve
the status quo regarding custody placement; (2) that there is generally a
presumption that physical custody should be awarded to the “primary
caretaker” of the child; and (3) that custody placements should only be
modified upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances.362
B.

Missouri Should Explicitly Define “Good Faith” as Used in Relocation
Disputes as a “Lack of Bad Faith”

When courts determine whether the custodial parent is seeking to move in
“good faith,” they should not, at that point, be determining whether the reasons
for moving are in the child’s best interest.363 Instead, they should be deciding
whether the reasons for moving are legitimate, and not made in “bad faith.”364
Courts, however, should be mindful that in some situations, a parent’s
desire to distance himself or herself from an ex-spouse or ex-lover does not
necessarily indicate that she is acting in bad faith.365 The need to “start a new
life” away from bad memories and friends, who only knew the parent as part of
a couple, can be compelling.366 Often women have moved away from their
homes and families to a new location determined by the father’s
employment.367 After the demise of the relationship, there may be no real
reason for the mother to continue to live near the father, apart from her own
family, who could provide a necessary support system after divorce.368 Putting
distance between a high-conflict mother and father can often lessen the
frequency and intensity of the conflict.369 Courts should seek to separate these
legitimate reasons for moving from situations where the move is intended
solely to interfere with a father’s visitation, or a tactic to harass or annoy him.
In determining whether a custodial parent is acting in good faith, the court
should not interrogate whether the parent’s reasons for moving are good or bad

362. See Bruch, supra note 34, at 286.
363. See Paige M. Dempsey, Note, Joint Custody and Relocation: The Supreme Court of
Nebraska Limits Relocation of Parents Sharing Joint Custody in Brown v. Brown, 35
CREIGHTON L. REV. 185, 211–12 (2001) (citing Jack v. Clinton, 609 N.W.2d 328 (Neb. 2000))
(discussing how the Nebraska Supreme Court differentiated between a “legitimate” reason for a
move from that reason meeting the child’s best interest).
364. Id.
365. See Sheehan, supra note 176, at 141.
366. Id. at 141–42 (noting that a woman’s identity may be partially derived from her
husband’s).
367. Id. at 141.
368. Id.
369. See supra notes 366–67 and accompanying text.
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reasons. Instead, the court should consider only whether the parent’s reasons
are a “pretext” for a vindictive motive.
In addition, the court should fashion a remedy for custodial parents who
have spent time and money litigating the relocation if the non-custodial parent
has objected in bad faith. At least one legislative proposal in Missouri has
sought to give custodial parents the opportunity to seek attorneys’ fees from a
non-custodial parent who objects to the relocation in bad faith.370
C. Missouri Should Change the Definition of Relocation to Allow Parents to
Move Short Distances without Seeking Judicial Intervention
Under current Missouri law, custodial parents have to seek permission to
move for any move, no matter how close or far away.371 The better practice
would be to define relocation as a fixed number of miles (for example, 150
miles) away from the previous residence. This definition would conform with
sound jurisprudence which holds that moves within a reasonable distance
should not be deemed a substantial change in circumstances that would trigger
a modification in custody.372
Under this new system, if a parent sought to move within the 150-mile
boundary, he or she would still be required to send notice to the non-relocating
parent, advising them of the move, but would not be required to seek
permission from the non-custodial parent or court before they could move. If
other circumstances besides those generally associated with relocation373 have
changed substantially, the non-relocating parent could seek a modification of
custody. This change in definition would prevent mothers like Ms. Osiafrom
spending thousands of dollars and waiting several years just to be able to move
a short distance away.
D. Missouri Should Create Evidentiary Rules which Would Prohibit Courts
from Forcing Parents to Prove Things They Cannot or Should Not Have
to Prove
Courts should create evidentiary rules that restrain non-relocating parents
from attacking the relocating parent’s motives for the move based on evidence
370. H.B. 1421, 90th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2000), available at
http://www.house.mo.gov/content.aspx?info=/bills00/biltxt00/intro00/HB1421I.htm.
371. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 452.377.1, 452.410, 452.411 (2002 & Supp. 2008).
372. See note 58 and accompanying text (citing statutes and cases where other states allow
relocations a short distance away, and proposed bills seeking to change Missouri’s law
accordingly); see also, e.g., Williams, 230 S.W.3d at 861 (allowing mother’s move because it was
only fifty-five miles away and that it would be unrealistic to inflexibly confine her to a
geographic area, even though the move was across state lines).
373. Courts should not consider factors generally associated with relocation such as a change
in residence, a change in neighborhood, a change in school, etc. as a change in circumstances to
justify a modification of custody.
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that the relocating parent has failed to obtain an exact address, the exact school
or daycare the children will attend, or even a firm offer of employment, if a
contingent employment offer appears reasonably calculated to lead to gainful
employment. Certainly courts should discourage moves where the custodial
parents have failed to undertake any investigation into the new living
arrangements and schools. But if a parent comes to court and can offer
evidence that, if allowed to move, she would likely live in a certain
neighborhood and her children would likely attend a certain school, she should
not be penalized for her inability to finalize housing or schooling due to the
speculative nature of relocation. Further, the absence of this evidence should
have little bearing on the outcome of the case because the trial court has
already deemed the custodial parent the more suitable caretaker of the child.
Courts should presume that the custodial parent will act in the child’s best
interest in choosing housing and making child care and educational decisions.
Absent evidence that a particular location will directly harm a child, this type
of evidence is likely irrelevant and unnecessary to an informed relocation
decision.
Courts should also limit the ability of custodial parents or non-custodial
parents to introduce general statistical evidence about the safety of the city or
the “quality” of a city’s schools without first requiring the parent to make an
offer of proof that the evidence would, more likely than not, have a substantial
and observable effect on a child’s actual development.374
Finally, courts should prohibit parents from introducing evidence
indicating whether a custodial parent would in fact move if the court denies the
relocation.375 Barring the introduction of this type of evidence is one further
step in limiting the ability of judges to grant contingent custody transfers and
to force a mother to make the “Sophie’s choice” of relocating or losing custody
of her child.376
E.

Missouri Should Allow Parents with an Imminent Need to Relocate an
Opportunity for a Preliminary Hearing

The trial court should allow a custodial parent to have a preliminary
hearing377 concerning the move if (1) there is a substantial likelihood that the
374. See infra notes 377–84 and accompanying text.
375. PROPOSED MODEL RELOCATION ACT § 406(b) (Am. Acad. Matrim. Lawyers 1997),
available
at
http://www.aaml.org/tasks/sites/default/assets/File/docs/publications/Model_
Relocation_Act.htm; Duggan, supra note 44, at 206 (advocating that this type of evidence be
excluded).
376. See Duggan, supra note 44, at 206 (arguing that mothers will generally concede that if
forced between the move and her child, she would pick her child, and this runs the risk the judge
will devalue her reasons for relocating or find her to be a selfish mother).
377. The preliminary hearing should be given higher priority on the court docket than any
actions under MO. REV. STAT. § 452.300 et. seq., except adult abuse actions and child abuse
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relocating parent would not be able to have both a trial and a ruling before the
date the parent must relocate; and (2) if by not getting an affirmative ruling
from the trial court before the slated move date, the parent’s move would
become moot due to an imminent opportunity which could not be delayed.378
At the preliminary hearing, the court should have the power to allow the
custodial parent to relocate, pending final adjudication on the merits, if:
(1) The relocating parent can prove the move is not made in bad faith and
the move is made for certain bona fide reasons, such as remarriage,
employment, educational opportunities, or natural disasters.
(2) Or there is a substantial likelihood that the relocating parent would
prevail at a full hearing;
(3) Unless the non-relocating parent proves that a temporary move would
endanger the health or welfare of the child.
If a parent meets the criteria for a temporary relocation, the court should
allow the parent to relocate, realizing, however, that the court has not yet
adjudicated the relocation on its merits. Courts should be satisfied that, given
the evidence before them, the move would likely be allowed if given a full
hearing. The ruling should not be taken lightly, given the drastic changes and
costs it would impose upon the family if the child, who has already relocated
and started adjusted to a new town and school, was forced to once again move.
The move would also impose a great cost upon the parent who would not have
decided to move, start a new job, buy a new house, etc., if she knew that the
child would not be allowed to accompany her.
This temporary mechanism realizes that, no matter how large of an
evidentiary burden a non-custodial father may face in bearing the burden of
showing that the move is not in the child’s best interest, some mothers may
ultimately be prevented from moving by fathers’ stall tactics in preventing the
case from getting an expedient trial.379 Unscrupulous parties could certainly
request extensive discovery, request extensions for judicial deadlines, and
delay the trial process as long as possible to pressure a custodial parent to

complaints. This type of expedited hearing is already in place for Family Access orders, where
parents who have been wrongly denied visitation with their children can seek immediate redress
from the courts. See Plax & Barrie, supra note 60, at 332 (discussing the expedited process for
Family Access orders); see also PROPOSED MODEL RELOCATION ACT, supra note 375, § 402
Comment (recognizing proposed relocations often involve time sensitive issues and should be
afforded appropriate priority on a court’s docket).
378. This mechanism is based loosely off the temporary hearing procedures codified in
PROPOSED MODEL RELOCATION ACT, supra note 375, § 401(b).
379. See supra notes 133–56, 174–75 and accompanying text.
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abandon a time-sensitive move.380 At the same time, it would be unwise to
force courts to make final decisions in all relocation cases on an expedited
basis.381 In “close-call” relocation cases, where there is a potential for the
relocation to harm the child, the judge should have the benefit of reviewing
discovery and evidence, which might not otherwise be obtained if the court
were forced to decide the case immediately, before each side could build much
of a case.382 This mechanism creates a middle ground: allowing parents the
flexibility to move quickly, while allowing judges the proper amount of time
necessary to fully determine whether the move is in the child’s best interests.
In reality, when a court allows a custodial parent to temporarily relocate
pending final adjudication, many non-custodial parents may feel pressure to
settle the case or withdraw their objections unless they truly felt that the move
would be harmful to the child. Consequently, this mechanism has an added
bonus of discouraging non-custodial parents from pursuing or continuing with
vexatious litigation.
To safeguard the integrity of the preliminary hearing, courts should be
allowed to sanction custodial parents who falsify or deliberately conceal
material information regarding the relocation at the temporary hearing.383 In
addition, courts should have the option to sanction non-relocating parents who
make frivolous objections to legitimate relocation requests which increase the
cost of litigation and unduly delay the proceedings.384
1.

Judicial Oversight

One reform needed to improve the integrity of the family court system is
implementing a system, though often overlooked, of oversight of the judicial
process. Family court judges have some of the most unfettered discretion of
any judges in the judiciary.385 Because the standards in family law cases are so
vague, judges are free to decide cases based on any number of personal
biases.386 This is problematic for a variety of reasons. First, it is simply
arbitrary to allow one person, who is often overworked387 and under-informed

380. See supra notes 133–56, 174–75 and accompanying text discussing the inherent delays
that many parents face in seeking to relocate. When one party obstinately delays the relocation
trial, the parent’s move could be prevented for even longer.
381. See Model Relocation Act, supra note 61, § 403 cmt. at 17 (“A full evidentiary hearing
may be crucial to a relocation determination.”).
382. Id.
383. See id. § 409.
384. See id. (providing for sanctions for unwarranted or frivolous proposals to or objection to
relocation of child).
385. See supra notes 285–356 and accompanying text (discussing biases).
386. See supra notes 185–210 (for vagueness), 285–356 (for biases) and accompanying text.
387. See Plax & Barrie, supra note 60, at 332 (recognizing that the family judges in some
circuits face enormous caseloads).
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of the familial situation388 and psychological research regarding the placement
of children,389 to decide cases based on his or her gut instincts.390 Divorce and
custody disputes occur at a time when the family is particularly vulnerable.
The decisions that the judge makes often decide the whole course of a child’s
life, create de facto decisions for parents on where to live and where to work,
and can often exacerbate depression and conflict.391 Thus, the integrity of
judicial interpretations of family law issues are “not only of basic human
importance to the women, men, and children who seek to enforce their rights,
but also critical to the public’s perception of the courts.”392 Missouri judges
regard family law as “lower-status work,” and often, unfortunately, a judge’s
distaste for the type of work is clear to many attorneys who appear before
them.393
Second, because the standards are vague and arbitrary, even when judges
try diligently to decide the case objectively and evenhandedly, their rulings
often contribute to a complete lack of consistency in the opinions of courts
within the same state, region, or even judicial circuit.394 It is nonsensical that
cases having almost identical facts can result in such different outcomes. The
problem is later compounded by appellate courts, which generally defer to the
judgment of the trial court unless the judge has abused his or her discretion.
What is left is a body of law that is virtually useless to any practitioner.395 As
a Vermont judge succinctly put it:
The lack of standards inhibits appellate review and does not provide the kind
of predictability and stability that lawyers and litigants should expect from
recent decisions. Without guidelines, we will quickly produce a hodgepodge
of decisions with no consistent thread other than “the trial court did not abuse
its discretion.” The reality of this kind of decision-making is that very similar
cases will result in very different decisions, and a custodial parent’s ability to
relocate will depend on the vicissitudes of individual judges. Because of
factual differences in cases, we will always be forced to tolerate some

388. See Duggan, supra note 44, at 196 (stating that judges always know less about what is
best for a child than the child’s parents).
389. See Charlow, supra note 107, at 279 (arguing that although social and psychological
research may reveal useful conclusions about the reality of child development in broken families,
judges generally do not apply the research to their decisions).
390. See supra note 285 and text.
391. See Sheehan, supra note 176, at 135.
392. See Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 527.
393. Id. at 537 n.197 (survey of judges showing 68% believing family law was sometimes,
usually, or always regarded as “lower status work”). Judges surveyed overwhelmingly chose
juvenile and family law as the least desirable judicial assignment, but most judges had not
received juvenile matters within the last five years. Id. at 537 n.198.
394. See supra notes 178–80, 185–90 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 207–10 and accompanying text.
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inconsistency in decision-making, but we ought not create the circumstances in
396
which it will flourish.

Further, the family court system lacks the transparency for scholars and
critics to expediently “catch” the abuse of any particular judge or to ascertain
troubling patterns of custody rulings across regions or circuits. In Missouri,
there is no “tracking system” where interested parties can review the decisions
made by trial judges. Family law cases, at the trial level, are not published on
databases like Westlaw or Lexis where one can search by keyword or topic.
Individual cases are docketed on the state’s case management system, but the
system does not include any substantive information about the litigants and the
dispute that would be helpful in gathering statistical information about court
rulings.397 Even if the trial court’s ruling were successfully obtained, it would
likely be unhelpful in understanding the basis for the court’s ruling. Although
courts are required to make findings of fact in child custody decisions, trial
courts often do not do so.398 When the judges fail to make comprehensive
findings of fact, it leaves the party interpreting the order to merely guess why
the judge decided the way he did. Therefore, the decision would be of limited
use to a researcher.399
This current lack of transparency and oversight can allow certain judges to
consistently decide cases wrongfully—based on biases400 or perhaps just plain
laziness401—with only the remote possibility of being caught and
reprimanded.402 As one government worker put it: “If you’re working for the
city and you dump a load of cement in the street, everybody can find out about
396. DeBeaumont v. Goodrich, 644 A.2d 843, 857–58 (Vt. 1994) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
397. See generally Missouri Case.net, https://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet/base/welcome.do
(last visited Aug. 1, 2010).
398. See MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.6 (2000) (court order must include written findings
detailing specific written factors); Schlotman v. Costa, 193 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)
(written findings required in relocation cases). But see id. at 433 (remanding case to trial court
because it did not make written findings); Osia v. Osia, No. 05WA-CC00096-01 (Mo. Cir. Ct.
24th Jud. Cir. Jul. 23, 2007), aff’d, 260 S.W.3d 438, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (court failed to
make written findings and appellate court issued memorandum opinion affirming trial court);
Pastis, supra note 45, at 425 (explaining that findings often are not made).
399. Files kept at local courthouses do not keep copies of exhibits or transcripts of the
proceedings. The researcher is left to only know what the trial court has told her about the facts of
the case, without the benefit of comparing the judge’s ruling with an actual record.
400. See supra notes 285–356 and accompanying text discussing judicial bias; see also Task
Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 155, at 540 (one family law attorney testifies that because
judges’ decisions are afforded much discretion on appeal, judges are more likely to follow their
own “predilections or biases” rather than apply the law).
401. See Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 540 (stating that attorneys are
often frustrated that family law judges do not keep abreast of new developments in the law and do
not follow the law).
402. See supra notes 426–30 and accompanying text. See infra notes 437–38 and
accompanying text
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it. But if the same government messes up a child’s life, it’s secret, and that’s
why people get away with it.”403 Although there are mechanisms to report
judicial misconduct, in family law cases they are not likely to be utilized.404 In
Missouri, once family law litigants have been assigned a judge, they generally
are reassigned the same judge for every subsequent modification
proceeding.405 Because of this, litigants are discouraged from reporting
judicial misconduct, since they know that the judge will be assigned to any
future modifications they seek. Similarly, attorneys are not likely to report
judicial misconduct either, since they often have to appear before the same
judge, and do not want to risk angering the judge by reporting him or her for
judicial misconduct.406 Since there are few checks and balances on the actions
of judges, family law courts have sometimes been termed “kangaroo courts”
because they offer little protection to litigants who are wronged.407
I propose that the state should create a family court judicial oversight
commission which audits trial court rulings.408 The auditor would randomly
compare the outcome of factually similar cases throughout the state, and could
report trends to state bar associations and the legislature.409 If the auditor
finds, for example, that certain trial courts are making inconsistent rulings in
similar factual scenarios, the auditor could suggest that either the courts or the
403. AMY NEUSTEIN & MICHAEL LESHER, FROM MADNESS TO MUTINY: WHY MOTHERS
ARE RUNNING FROM FAMILY COURTS—AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 205 (2005)
(criticizing the secrecy of family court rulings and noting that the results would likely cause
public outrage if known).
404. For example, complaints can be made through the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.
See Missouri Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, http://www.mochiefcounsel.org/index.htm
(last visited Aug. 1, 2010). There is also the option of voting out poor-quality judges. But this is
not likely to be very helpful either. In general, the voting public is unfamiliar with the demeanor
and actions of judges well enough to be able to cast an informed vote.
405. MO. SUP. CT. R. 51.05(a); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.410.2 (2000).
406. Based on conversations the author has had with many family law attorneys. See also
Task Force on Gender & Justice, supra note 154, at 539 (explaining that family law attorneys are
often put in an “awkward position of repeatedly appearing before the judge on the case who, in
turn, may not only find the assignment distasteful, but may be particularly impatient with a party
who is regularly before the court.”). But see MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 4-8.3(b) (2007)
(“A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial
conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge’s fitness for office shall inform the
appropriate authority.”).
407. NEUSTEIN & LESHER, supra note 403, at 28.
408. The Missouri State Auditor is responsible for auditing courts for fiscal and budgetary
matters. However, there is no indication the Auditor, or any other authority, randomly reviews
courts for substantive legal-related problems. See Missouri State Auditor’s Office,
http://www.auditor.mo.gov/auditreports/courts.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
409. See NEUSTEIN & LESHER, supra note 403, at 216–17 (recommending a special
commission to review case decisions of sitting family court judges; recommending the
commissions consist of judges, psychologists, and laypersons; and recommending the
commission release annual reports).
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legislature create procedural or substantive rules to guide trial court judges.
Likewise, the auditors would be looking for individual biases from judges. If a
judge, for example, heard many relocation cases, and never allowed one—even
in varying factual situations—the judge should likely be investigated for lack
of impartiality. In the same respect, if it is obvious that a particular judge has
made clearly biased statements and issued discriminatory rulings to litigants,
state disciplinary authorities should also investigate the judge. This system
would serve as an important check on the authority of judges, and provide a
vital way to ensure that cases are being decided fairly and consistently across
the state.
2.

Benefits

As one judge has put it:
The law pretends that we can determine with some high degree of predictive
accuracy whether a move . . . will be in a child’s best interest—we can’t. The
truth is this: there is no evidence that our decisions in these types of cases
result in an outcome that is any better for the child than if the parents did rock410
paper-scissors.

Any custody trial is corrosive to a family, but in relocation disputes, the worst
aspects of custody trials are multiplied.411
Maintaining predictability and balance in trial judges’ rulings has been a
widely recognized problem.412 At the same time, most commentators and
judges have emphasized that all custody disputes are different. This system
would reduce the amount of relocation litigation and would expedite the
process of time-sensitive relocation trials. Such a system would discourage
prolonged conflict between the parents and satisfy concerns about children’s
sense of urgency and the need for continuity, while allowing the court to
prevent relocations that would be detrimental to a child.413
Requiring the non-custodial parent to bear the burden of proving that
relocation is not in the best interest of the child is consistent with the principal
that once a custodial parent has been deemed a fit caretaker, courts should not
modify the custody arrangement unless a significant change in circumstances
has occurred. In today’s mobile society, most relocations simply should not
qualify as a significant enough change to reverse custody. Deferring to the

410. Duggan, supra note 44, at 193; See also Comment, Alternatives to “Parental Right” in
Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151, 153–54 (1963) (arguing that
the standard may disguise mere “judicial intuition”).
411. Duggan, supra note 44, at 194.
412. See Tracia, supra note 35, at 166 (discussing the problems with Massachusetts’
relocation law); Baures v. Lewis, 770 A.2d 214, 228 (N.J. 2001) (recognizing unpredictability and
lack of guidance to trial judges in New Jersey’s old relocation statute).
413. See Charlow, supra note 107, at 284.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

CONSIGNING WOMEN TO THE IMMEDIATE ORBIT OF A MAN

1423

judgment of the custodial parent prevents “the vexation and expense [of
defending] . . . unjustified lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters
reliance on judicial actions by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent
decisions.”414
Allowing courts to micromanage the day-to-day decisions parents make
about their careers and families may cause parents constant stress about how
their decisions will be perceived by a detached judge and may change the way
the parents make parenting decisions. It also furthers the possibility that
parents will be exposed to unnecessary litigation simply because they seek to
move.415 In corporate law, courts use the “business judgment rule” to presume
that corporate directors are acting in the best interests of their corporation and
the court will only scrutinize directors’ decisions if they have violated a duty of
care. In effect, the courts have recognized that the directors, not judges, know
more about what is necessary to run a successful business and courts are loathe
to second guess the business decisions of corporate directors. In family law,
the same holds true for the decisions of intact parents.416 When parents are
divorced or unmarried, however, Missouri courts apparently no longer assume
that parents are capable of keeping the child’s best interests in mind, and
instead force judges, rather than the parents, to make major decisions regarding
the child. In these situations, courts should apply what I call the “family
judgment rule” to presume that the decisions made by a custodial parent are
made with the family’s best interest in mind unless the custodial parent is
clearly acting in bad faith or in a way that is likely to endanger a child. Since
mothers generally bear the brunt of a child’s day-to-day care, requiring fathers
414. Cocus, supra note 44, at 111.
415. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 481 (Cal. 1996)) (explaining that
pressuring parents to not relocate would undermine the court’s interest “in minimizing costly
litigation over custody and require the trial courts to “micromanage” family decision-making by
second-guessing reasons for everyday decisions about career and family.”).
416. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979).
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as
a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently
followed that course. . . . The law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment
required for making life’s difficult decisions. More important, historically it has
recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children. … That some parents “may at times be acting against the interests of their
children” . . . creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those
pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child’s best
interests. . . . The statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental
authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to
American tradition. . . . Simply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child
or because it involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make that
decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state.
Id. (citations omitted).
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to show that relocation would harm the child maintains the continuity of care
the child has with its primary caretaker, the mother, while allowing the court
the flexibility to prevent bad faith and detrimental relocations.417 Changing the
burden of proof is not enough to protect the interests of the custodial parent
and the child.418 Just as shareholders are discouraged from suing corporations
if they know they will be met with the business judgment rule, in family law,
the non-custodial parent, facing a heavy burden, would also be less likely to
pursue litigation unless he or she truly believed that preventing relocation
would be in the best interests of the child.419 But in relocation cases, there is
often an added wrinkle: time-sensitivity. The litigation process is slow, and
significant delays in relocation can prevent parents from obtaining a job or an
educational opportunity that served as the basis of their relocation requests.
Unscrupulous non-custodial parents may, for that very reason, contest
relocations for frivolous reasons, even if they are “unqualified for or
uninterested in obtaining custody.”420 For this reason, there must be a
procedure in place to ensure that parents faced with time-sensitive relocations
can seek expedited hearings.
Loving parents should not be treated like criminals, shackled to their past
homes and communities merely because they want to build a better life for
themselves and their children.421 To be sure, “an award of custody to a parent
should [not] be interpreted as a sentence to immobilization.”422 As other
authors have noted, denying a mother the right to relocate with her children is,
in many ways, putting her under house arrest.423 And for all the social costs
that the law imposes upon a mother and her new family unit, the relocation law
cannot even meet its implied purpose of “simulating unity.” In sum,
A rule of law that effectively requires custodial parents to gamble custody of
the children before they can live with their children and new spouses . . . while
imposing no similar limitations on noncustodial parents who profess to be
“highly involved” in the lives of their children—seems the very antithesis of
424
domestic stability. It is also grossly unfair.

417. Sheehan, supra note 176, at 148; see generally Bruch, supra note 34, 281–94.
418. Contra Cocus, supra note 46, at 103 (“[A]ll that is needed is a simple shift in the burden
of proof.”).
419. Id. at 111.
420. Bruch & Bowermaster, supra note 39, at 248.
421. “Our precedent has essentially placed custodial parents in the untenable position of being
prisoners in the state . . . .” Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856, 864 (Ark. Ct. App.
2002) (Bird, S., concurring).
422. Gottschall v. Gottschall, 316 N.W.2d 610, 612 (Neb. 1982); In re Marriage of Dusing,
654 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (“Provisions for a relationship with both parents can
be made other than by confining the wife’s residence to Butler County.”).
423. LaFrance, supra note 54, at 94.
424. Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d at 873.
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CONCLUSION
About every ten years, most states dramatically reverse the course that they
have taken in relocation disputes.425 Missouri’s current relocation statute was
implemented in 1998.426 For the last twelve years, Missouri has developed a
body of relocation law that establishes no clear guidelines and makes it
tremendously difficult for custodial parents to move with their children.
Missouri’s time has come: it is time to break free from an outdated system that
confines women to the immediate geographical area of their ex-lovers, and
move toward a system that recognizes the realities of today’s modern mobile
society. When a relationship ends, by definition, things cannot stay the same
and adults should realize the access to their children will necessarily change. It
is unrealistic and naïve for courts or former partners to assume that separated
parents will continue to live in the same area indefinitely. Regardless of life
changes, a custodial parent, found by the court to be a suitable caretaker, is no
less capable of being a responsible parent merely because he or she has
requested to relocate. Courts should not penalize mothers for seeking to
improve their lives by relocating. This proposal for change seeks to protect
mothers’ right to relocate, while preserving a father’s relationship with his
children, and once implemented, would bring consistency, fairness, and
judicial oversight to relocation decisions. Although, as Balzac once stated,
“Maternal love makes of every woman a slave,”427 it is time for Missouri to
unlock the shackles that restrain women to the vicinity of their former partners
and allow mothers the opportunity to pursue their goals and dreams.
JULIE HIXSON-LAMBSON*

425. PHILIP M. STAHL & LESLIE M. DROZD, RELOCATION ISSUES IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES
4 (2006).
426. Plax & Barrie, supra note 60, at 328.
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Child Relocation Decision-Making Tool
Initial Presumptions:
1. International Moves. This test is not intended to be used when the
contemplated move is an international move. International moves incorporate three
potential concerns that are not at issue in domestic relations: the problem of
retaining jurisdiction of the child and that the custody order will be honored; the
problem of fashioning a reasonable visitation schedule when the distance is so
great; and the problem that the cultural conditions of the country may put the child
at risk. See generally Lawrence Katz, When the Question Involved An
International Move: The Answer May Lie in Retaining U.S. Jurisdiction, 28 SPG
Fam. Advoc. 40 (2006). Courts should devise their own standards for evaluating
international relocation cases.
2. Domestic Violence / Restricted Custody. This test is not intended to be used
when the non-custodial parent has supervised visitation privileges, or has
committed violence against the custodial parent or the child. It should presumably
never be in the child’s interest to change custody to the non-custodial parent under
these circumstances. See generally Janet M. Bowermaster, Relocation Custody
Disputes Involving Domestic Violence, 46 U. Kan. L. Rev. 433 (1998).

Instructions:
Fill out the following form as directed.
comments to clarify each factor.

Consult the interpretive notes and

Step 1: Motive of Custodial Parent’s Move
I believe the custodial parent has a

□
□
That reason is:

good faith
bad faith

reason for seeking to relocate.

Enter reason here.

 If the reason is a good faith reason, go to Step 2.
 If the reason is a bad faith reason, this analysis is over and the
relocation should be presumptively denied.
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Step 2: Best Interest of the Child Factors
1. The non-custodial parent has been actively involved in the child/children’s
life.1
 strongly disagree

How Important is this Factor?

 very important

 disagree

 somewhat important

 neutral

 neutral

 agree

 not important

 strongly agree

 not applicable

2. The non-custodial parent has been responsible in financially supporting
the child/children.2
 strongly disagree

How Important is this Factor?

 very important

 disagree

 somewhat important

 neutral

 neutral

 agree

 not important

 strongly agree

 not applicable

3. If relocation is allowed, the court can fashion an alternative visitation
schedule which will promote and foster the non-relocating parent’s
relationship with the child/children.3
 strongly disagree

How Important is this Factor?

 very important

 disagree

 somewhat important

 neutral

 neutral

 agree

 not important

 strongly agree

 not applicable

4. The non-custodial parent has the ability to relocate with the child/children
to the new town.4
 strongly disagree

How Important is this Factor?

 very important

 disagree

 somewhat important

 neutral

 neutral

 agree

 not important

 strongly agree

 not applicable
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5. If allowed to move, the relocating parent will likely cooperate to comply
with the newly fashioned visitation order.5
 strongly disagree

How Important is this Factor?

 very important

 disagree

 somewhat important

 neutral

 neutral

 agree

 not important

 strongly agree

 not applicable

6. The non-custodial parent’s motives in resisting the relocation are based on
improper motives.6
 strongly disagree

How Important is this Factor?

 very important

 disagree

 somewhat important

 neutral

 neutral

 agree

 not important

 strongly agree

 not applicable

7. The move will have substantial benefits to the custodial parent.7
 strongly disagree

How Important is this Factor?

 very important

 disagree

 somewhat important

 neutral

 neutral

 agree

 not important

 strongly agree

 not applicable

List the benefits:

8. The relocation will likely enhance the quality of life of the child/children.8
 strongly disagree

How Important is this Factor?

 very important

 disagree

 somewhat important

 neutral

 neutral

 agree

 not important

 strongly agree

 not applicable

List the benefits:
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9. The parties can afford the transportation costs associated with the
relocation, taking into account alternative ways of allocating
transportation expenses.9
 strongly disagree

How Important is this Factor?

 very important

 disagree

 somewhat important

 neutral

 neutral

 agree

 not important

 strongly agree

 not applicable

10. The child has expressed a preference in remaining with the custodial
parent and/or relocating with the custodial parent, if the child is of
sufficient age and maturity to express a preference.10
 strongly disagree

How Important is this Factor?

 very important

 disagree

 somewhat important

 neutral

 neutral

 agree

 not important

 strongly agree

 not applicable

11. The move will allow the child to maintain their relationships with other
close family members such as siblings, grandparents, aunts/uncles, and
cousins.11
 strongly disagree

How Important is this Factor?

 very important

 disagree

 somewhat important

 neutral

 neutral

 agree

 not important

 strongly agree

 not applicable

The relocation “best interest” score is: _____.
The relocation:

□

is likely in the best interests of the child

□

may or may not be in the best interests of the child

□

is likely not in the best interests of the child
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Step 3: The Least Detrimental Alternative
If the relocation is presumptively not in the best interests of the child, would it be
more detrimental to the child to change custody than it would be for the child to
relocate with the custodial parent?

□

more detrimental to change custody

□

more detrimental to relocate with custodial parent

List Reasons Why:

Step 4: Should the Presumptions Be Rebutted
Should the presumption that the relocation is in the best interests of the child be
rebutted?

□

yes

□

no

If no, the inquiry is over and the relocation should be granted.
If yes, is:

□
□

the calculation unjust or improper because it does not
adequately reflect the best interests of the child
the move is likely to endanger the health or welfare of
the child

If the presumption is rebutted, findings of fact and conclusions of law must be
made regarding why the presumption should be rebutted.
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COMMENTS AND INTERPRETIVE NOTES:
1. If the non-custodial parent has not been actively involved in the child’s
life, the court should typically allow the custodial parent to move rather than
considering transferring custody to the non-custodial parent. This includes
non-custodial parents who have been granted extensive custody time and failed
to exercise it, or non-custodial parents who have shown little or no interest in
pursuing extensive custody time with the child. This also would include noncustodial parents whose history of exercising custody of the child is sporadic
(i.e., the parent may be highly involved in the child’s life for two months and
then disappear for five months). The court should also consider if the noncustodial parent only started to be actively involved in the child’s life after
being notified of the custodial parent’s prospective relocation.


This assumption ensures that the parent who has been actively
involved in the child’s life will be able to remain with the child. This
assumption also prevents non-involved parents from forcing the other
parent into settlement concessions—such as the payment of less child
support in return for the parent being able to move. It also prevents
non-custodial parents who seek to “control” of the mother and the
child, rather than maintaining a parental relationship with the child, is
not allowed to veto a move by the parent who is cultivating a parental
relationship. It also follows the psychological research that “Nonresident fathers who are not highly motivated to enact the parental role
or who lack the skills to be effective parents are unlikely to benefit
their children, even under conditions of regular visitation.” Amato &
Gilbreth, supra note 88, at 569.



See Cullison v. Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(considering the father’s distant relationship and his sporadic and
inconsistent visitation as a factor weighing against him); Proposed
Model Relocation Act § 405 (American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers 1997) (taking into consideration the “nature, quality, extent
of involvement and duration of the relationship of the child with each
parent”); Richards, supra note 55, at 283; Valdespino, supra 99, at 22.

2. If the non-custodial parent has a history of being delinquent in, or
altogether failing to pay court ordered child support or other child related
expenses (i.e., medical bills), because of either financial burdens or ideological
reasons, the court should typically allow the custodial parent to move rather
than considering transferring custody to the non-custodial parent.


The reality is that it generally costs more to raise a child than a parent
is receiving in child support payments. If a parent cannot afford to
make timely child support payments, a court should assume that they
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also would have the financial inability to pay for the normal household
expenses of the child. Likewise, if the non-custodial parent is either
neglecting his court ordered support duty or willfully avoiding the
obligation, the court should be concerned about transferring custody to
the parent since the parent has shown disrespect for the authority of
the court and a disregard for child’s well being.


See, e.g., Richards, supra note 55, at 267 & n.122; La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 9:355.12(9) (Supp. 2007).

3. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:355.12(3) (Supp. 2007) (“The feasibility of
preserving a good relationship between the nonrelocating parent and the child
through suitable visitation arrangements . . .”).
See Proposed Model
Relocation Act § 405 (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1997);
Richards, supra note 55, at 283; Valdespino, supra note 99, at 22–23; “A
reasonable schedule of visitation is one that provides a satisfactory basis for
preserving and fostering a child’s relationship with the non-custodial parent”
even if it reduces the total number of visitation days. Farnsworth v.
Farnsworth, 597 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Neb. 1999).
4. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:355.12(10) (Supp. 2007).
5. Proposed Model Relocation Act § 405 (American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers 1997); Richards, Proposed Model Relocation Statute,
supra note, at 283. A parent’s past behavior of denying visitation may show an
unwillingness to cooperate with a court plan if they move outside the
jurisdiction. But a parent’s willingness to offer the other parent a generous
visitation plan, offer alternative ways for the non-custodial parent to keep in
touch with the child, such as virtual communication, telephone calls, and dropin visits, the parent’s motives in seeking to relocate are likely pure and the
parent will mostly likely cooperate to make sure the non-custodial parent is
given the opportunity to be involved in the child’s life, despite the relocation.
But if a judge foresees problems with a parent failing to comply with the
custody order after the relocation, requiring the parent to post a bond to secure
compliance may alleviate concerns that the custodial parent will frustrate the
other parent’s visitation rights. See Valdespino, supra note 99, at 24. See also
Cullison v. Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (considering
the mother’s willingness to allow frequent and meaningful contact with the
father as a factor weighing in favor of the move).
6. Sometimes a non-custodial parent’s reason for opposing the litigation is
for an improper motive, such as using his power to delay the relocation as a
tactic to reduce his child support. See Ford, supra note 69, at 11; Richards,
supra note 55, at 267. In other cases, a non-custodial parent may oppose the
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move as a way of seeking to exert control over his ex-wife. See Ford, supra
note 69, at 11; Richards, supra note 55, at 267.


See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:355.12(7) (Supp. 2007); Proposed Model
Relocation Act § 405 (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
1997); Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at 319–21.

7. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:355.12(6) (Supp. 2007); Proposed Model
Relocation Act § 405 (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1997)
(“Whether the relocation of the child will enhance the general quality of life
for both the custodial parent seeking the relocation and the child, including but
not limited to financial or emotional benefit and educational opportunity.”).
See Cullison v. Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(considering the mother’s option of being able to work from home and spend
more time with the children if allowed to move as a factor weighing in favor of
relocation); Abernathy v. Meier, 45 S.W.3d 917, 924 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (the
custodial parent’s economic, emotional, and physical well-being are important
factors to consider); Valdespino, supra note 99, at 23–24. Some of the benefits
could include an increase in the parent’s income, better employment
opportunity for the parent, better housing conditions, educational
improvement, closer access to a support system such as family relatives. See
Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 597 N.W.2d 592 (Neb. 1999).
8. See, e.g., Cullison v. Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(considering the community, school, and recreational benefits to the children
as a factor weighing in favor of the move); Proposed Model Relocation Act,
supra note 375, § 405 (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1997);
Richards, supra note 55, at 283; Valdespino, supra note 99, at 23–24.
9. See Valdespino, supra note 99, at 23.
10. See Cullison v. Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(considering the children’s desire to remain with their mother as a factor
weighing in favor of the move); Becker v. Becker, 745 S.W.2d 229 (Mo. App.
1987) (changing custody from mother to father where mother moved to take
new job and teenage children preferred to live with father since they had
friends, relatives, and school-related events they enjoyed in the area); Proposed
Model Relocation Act, supra note 375, § 405; Richards, supra note 55, at 123,
283; Valdespino, supra note 99, at 23; Pfenning, supra note 180, at 129;
Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 38, at 323; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 208, §
30 (child over age fourteen must consent to relocation or court must grant
permission upon good cause); Emery et al. supra note 285. See generally Gary
A. Debele, A Children’s Rights Approach to Relocation: A Meaningful Best
Interests Standard, 10 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law 75 (1998). But cf. Ford,
supra note 69, at 52 (arguing that if parents in intact families can make moves
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affecting their children without judicial intervention, then the court should
value the custodial parent’s decision to move over the child’s desire to stay).
11. See Cullison v. Thiessen, 51 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(considering the children’s close relationship with other household members,
including their half-brother and mother’s new husband, as a factor weighing in
favor of the move).


After assessing whether a relocating parent’s move is made in good
faith, and attempting to assess the best interest factors, a judge may
rebut the form if relocation would endanger a child’s mental,
emotional, or physical health.
o

Endangering a child’s mental, emotional, or physical health is
more than just the trauma that would be associated with any move.
This factor is likely met if the child has a very strong relationship
with the non-custodial parent and relocation would severely strain
that relationship. See Ford, supra note 69, at 47–49 (discussing
Kentucky’s endangerment standard); see also Wallerstein & Tanke,
supra note 38, at 319 (supporting the idea that court’s should protect
a child’s most important relationship, and sometimes that
relationship may be with the non-custodial parent); Richards, supra
note 55, at 263–64 (noting that sometimes the non-custodial parent
is the primary “psychological parent” and separating the child from
that parent may be detrimental). It may also occur if the relocation
is a considerable distance away and the child is of an age that would
effectively prevent the non-custodial parent from maintaining
visitation with the child for a long span of time (until the child
reaches an age where long periods of visitation time would be
appropriate), and there are not other compelling reasons why the
relocation should be granted. It may also occur if the relocating
parent has bona fide reasons for a move, but the child has a health
condition that necessitates stability or close proximity to certain
medical facilities. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.340(3)(a),(b),(c)
(instructing that relocation should be denied if it would
fundamentally alter the relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent in a way that would threaten mental or emotional
harm to the child—because the cumulative benefits of changing
custody from the custodial parent to the non-custodial parent would
outweigh the harm caused); Richards, supra note 55, at 265, 282;
Terry, supra note 84, at 184 (giving examples of situations where
relocation could jeopardize the well-being of the child, including (1)
relocating a child with a serious medical condition to an area where
adequate treatment is unavailable; (2) relocating a child with special
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needs to an area without adequate educational opportunities tailored
to the child’s needs; or (3) relocating to a residence of a confirmed
child abuser).


Example 1: Mother A, the primary parent, seeks to relocate
from Texas to Michigan with her three-month-old child. The
parent’s marriage ended shortly before the child was born. Father
loves the child, and visits the child as much as he can, but the
child does not spend overnights with the father due to the child’s
young age. Mother’s reason for relocating from Texas to
Michigan is because she has found a job there that has the same
hour requirements, but pays $1.50 more per hour. Other than this
job, there are no other compelling reasons for the relocation.
There is no reason to believe the father would not be an adequate
caretaker. The court should not grant the relocation, and should
grant custody to father if mother chooses to relocate. If mother
stays, she may retain primary custody of the child. Obviously
neither choice is optimal—if the mother moved to New York,
there is virtually no way to fashion a visitation agreement where
the child could have a relationship with the father for at least
several years, due to the child’s young age and the great distance.
Nor is it optimal for the child to suddenly live apart from its
primary caretaker to live with a parent who has had little
opportunity to attach with the child. The court should force the
mother to make the Sophie’s choice of choosing to stay and retain
custody of the child, or to relocate and change custody to the
child’s father. While, depending on other facts, this relocation
may have been allowed if the child were a few years older and
could tolerate extended periods of visitation, or if the mother had
a very compelling reason for the move—despite the disadvantages
to the father, it should be discouraged in this context because of
the limited benefits of the move and the severe consequences of
totally cutting off a relationship with the father for several years.



Example 2: Mother B, the primary parent, seeks to relocate
200 miles away to pursue a career advancement opportunity that
would give her a promotion and a raise. Mother and Father have
both been involved in the child’s life, and there is no reason to
believe that the father would not be an adequate caretaker for the
child. Child has autism and there is compelling evidence that
even minor changes in the child’s life causes the child severe
anguish and causes the child to regress. In other words, the child
has a medical need for stability. Certainly, it would not be in the
child’s best interest to relocate. Nor would it be in the child’s best
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interest for the court to change custody to father—this too would
exacerbate the child’s medical condition. This is a prime example
of a situation where a court should seek to discourage the
relocation. The court should force the mother to make the
Sophie’s choice. The court should not allow the relocation, and
threaten to change custody to father if the mother chooses to
move. If the mother chooses to stay, she may retain primary
custodian of the child. If she chooses to relocate anyway, despite
the convincing evidence that her child will be severely harmed,
the court has probably made the right decision to change custody
to the father, even if it is not the optimal choice. The mother’s
decision to move to the severe detriment of the child would
indicate that she does not sincerely act in the child’s best interests.


Example 3: Child C is 8 years old and has a rare genetic
disorder that requires her to undergo frequent hospital stays, and
requires the expertise of highly specialized doctors. Mother C, and
Father C divorced when the child was 3. Mother C has primary
physical custody, and Father C has visitation every other
weekend, extended summer visitation, and visitation over certain
holidays. There is no reason to believe father would not be an
adequate caretaker of the child. Mother C remarried a year after
her divorce, and her and Stepfather C have two children of their
own from this marriage—Child C’s half-siblings. Stepfather C’s
mother is elderly and has lived alone, but has recently been
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s and can no longer live alone and care
for herself. Stepfather C seeks to relocate with his wife and
children to the town where his mother lives—a rural area. The
town is 45 miles from the nearest hospital and that hospital lacks
the medical equipment and specialized doctors needed to assist
with Child C’s condition. Although this situation is tough,
Mother C has a very compelling reason to move, the court should
discourage the move and force her to make a Sophie’s Choice. If
she stays, she can retain primary custody of Child C, but if she
relocates Father C will be awarded primary physical custody.
Although it is likely not optimal for Child C to change primary
caregivers, her very specific health conditions necessitate her
staying within close proximity to the specialized medical facilities
she needs. Although this situation is arguably one of the most
difficult ones, the court should discourage the move. See
Hollandsworth v. Knyzewski, 79 S.W.3d 856, 863 (Ark. 2002)
(Pittman, J. concurring) (“[I]n the case of a child suffering from a
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serious medical condition, ready access to appropriate health care
facilities may be an overriding concern.”).


Situations where the best interest factors would necessitate
changing custody to father, but moving with the mother would not
“endanger” the child’s welfare.
o

Example 1: Mother D and Father D divorced when child
was 12. They both are adequate and competent parents. Both
parents have been highly involved in the child’s life and the
child has a strong connection to them both. Both parents live
in the same town and in the same public school district. Child
D is now 16 and has just started her senior year of high
school, where she has attended her whole life. Child D is
academically advanced, is taking AP courses, and is highly
involved in sports and other extracurricular activities. Mother
D’s employer has merged with another company and is
eliminating her position her geographic market. They have,
however, offered Mother D an opportunity to take a position
in another metropolitan area 300 miles away. The position
raises Mother D two levels and almost doubles her salary. In
order to take this position, mother must move immediately
and cannot postpone the move. If she does not take the
opportunity, she will lose her job. Going through the court’s
analysis, the mother obviously has a good faith reason for the
move. In step two, the court analyzes the best interest factors
and finds that given the child’s age, the distance of the move,
the child’s close relationship with both parents, and the
child’s significant interest in finishing her last year of high
school in the school she has attended her whole life, the court
decides the relocation is not in the best interests of the child.
Going to step 3, although Child D would not be “endangered”
by moving with her mother, the move would be very
traumatic her for. Although Child D could arguably adjust to
the move, and although her mother is an adequate caretaker,
the court should probably find that the detriment of the move
is not outweighed by the benefit of remaining with her
primary caretaker. The court should transfer custody to the
father if the mother moves. By remaining with father, she
would be able to complete her last year of high school
without interruption.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1438

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 54:1365

